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Abstract 
The Digi tal Mi l lennium Copyright Act ( DMCA) of 1 998 was the latest 
substantial rev ision of U .S .  Copyright Law. Implemented largel y  as a response to the 
I nternet, the DMCA has become a central target in a struggle over the power of 
copyright law-a law the first Congress designed in 1 790 in keeping with the 
language of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States to promote 
the "Progress of Science and the useful  Arts ." But how i s  that progress best assured? 
Increasingly over the years, the promotion of science and usefu l  arts has become a 
single c laim encompassing two diametrical l y  opposed notions, those that guarantee 
copyright ownership, and those that explicit ly l imit the scope and power of that 
ownership. It i s  the relative power of those countervail ing efforts that assures either 
the success or fai lure of the law' s  purpose. Too l i ttle power and creative m inds are 
not given incentive to create. Too much power and the publ ic is restricted from 
harvesting-and building upon-the knowledge of others . 
The DMCA provided a safeguard to protect copyright owners from Internet 
pirates. But when adding the weight of additional power to copyright owners, did the 
DMCA tilt the scale away from the progress of science and useful arts? Thi s  thesis 
exami nes two particular provisions of the DMCA, Section 1 20 I, "Circumvention of 
copyright protection systems, and Section 5 1 2 , "Limitations on l iab i l i ty relating to 
material onl ine." These provisions are examined in l ight of the purpose of copyright 
Jaw as granted by the Constitution of the United States. 
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IV 
Chapter 1: I ntrod uction 
The purpose of thi s  thesis i s  to explore some major ways in  which the Digital  
M il lennium Copyr ight Act of 1 998 (DMCA) 1 affects the delicate balance between 
copyright ownership and the freedom of access to information . To accompl i sh that 
objective, this thesis wi l l  begin by discussing the constitutional- legal underpinnings 
of copyr ight law, compar ing theories of intel lectual property to current practices as 
driven by the Digital M i l l ennium Copyright Act of 1 998.  
I t  should be noted that this thesis ,  drawing upon the author's experience as a 
corporate web manager ,  started with purely "practical" concems of effects of the 
DMCA upon corporate web communicators .  lt became apparent, however , that with 
the key sections of the legislation examined here, the DMCA seemed to be at odds 
with the underpinnings of intel lectual property l aw as expressed in Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution of the United States.2 That constitutional provis ion cal led for a 
balance : "To promote the Progress of Science and usefu l  Arts, by securing for l imi ted 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Inventions and 
Discoveries ." 
Note also that this thesis i s  restr icted to study of only two parts-Section 5 1 2 
and Section 1 20 1  of the DMCA. To confine this thesis to manageable  size, related 
pieces of recent copyr ight legi slation-including the copyr ight-related provi sions of 
1 Digital Mi l lennium Copyright Act of 1 99X.  Pub .L .No.  1 05-304. 1 1 2 Stat. 2X60. 
2 Constitut ion ofthe U ni ted States. Article L Sec. X.  
the 342-page USA Patriot Act (USAPA)3 and the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 
200 1 4-are not considered here. 
The basics are deceptively easy to grasp-filing for copyright, duration of 
copyright, and what can be copyrighted. Al l  of that is defined by statute, as 
interpreted by court decisions. That's the easy part, and i t  may not be a l l  that easy. 
Copyright law, after al l ,  may be cal led-in that legal c l iche-old wine in new bottles .  
But the World Wide Web and the Internet are strange and expansive new containers 
and Jeakers of content, so some of the old intel lectual property law and under lying 
theories of law sometimes seem to be uneasy concepts in the high-tech world of 
communication that has grown so explosively since the mid- 1 980s. 
An effort wi l l  be made to provide readers  of this  thesi s  with some basic 
appreciation of ways in which copyright J aw in  general appl i es to the Internet. The 
main focus of this research, however, will aim at the DMCA, and that involves 
concepts and theories of intel lectual property. 
A. A Cal l  to Arms 
"When copy machines came on the market, publi shers demanded protection; 
when the VCR got popular ,  Hol lywood was said to be on the chopping block; and the 
digital audio tape industry, which predated CDs, was wiped out because the music 
industry was so afraid of pirating, i t  demanded a tax ( translation: advance fine) be 
attached to the sale of any DA T."5 
3 USA Patriot Act, I 07'11 Congress. I st Sess .. H .R .  3 1 62 .  
4 Cyber Security Enhancement Act. I 07'11 Congress. I st Sess . . H . R .  34�2. 
� Piatt. M ickie Voges. The aarrrgh-ument m·er computer pira(y. by Bryan R i vers. 
www.eaelctribune.com 1newsistories/2002060(Jill OO I .htm. [ last vis ited. April 2, 2003] .  
2 
By the early 1 990s, the Internet was the latest technology to threaten 
copyright protections. And shortly thereafter, two polarized camps of thought had 
developed. Those in one camp saw the Internet as a new intrusion on their own 
securi ty and property rights. Thi s i s  the camp of the inventors, the writers, the 
moviemakers, the artists, and the musicians. In thi s  camp, the new possibil ities 
offered by the Internet are tempered by new security threats .  A record company sees 
in the Internet a new form of low-cost marketing possibil it ies; a way to reach the 
entire world with the news of new music .  At the same time, the same record company 
struggles with Internet piracy-Information superhighway thieves steal ing this new 
music and delivering i t  to the world using the very same Internet technology that 
record companies use to promote their products. 
The other camp harbored the fear of losing free access to information. In this 
camp of educators, l ibrarians, researchers, and phi losophers, the Internet was an 
unprecedented new vehicle for the transmission of ideas, wonderful ly  devoid of 
corporate control . If allowed to flourish, the Internet will accelerate "observation, 
reflection, and experiment.''6 If mere thousands were once exposed to an i dea, the 
Internet wi l l  ensure that mi l l ions wil l  now see it. And these ideas wi l l  spawn 
"Discoveries, Inventions, and Improvements ." 7 
The debate over the freedom of inforn1ation on the Internet has developed i nto 
a ful l -scale battle. The battle is a philosophical and economic  one, pitting the idea of 
property rights against the advantages of the freedom of information . The property 
6 See in(i·a note 8 .  
7 See i1;(i·a note 8 .  
rights argument i s  simple to understand, and at a glance seems logical . When you 
purchase a home, for example, the home is your property. Simi larly, i f  you write an 
article, that article is your property. That analogy breaks down, however, when we 
consider the term of ownership. Home ownership can be arranged to last indefinitely. 
The ownership of an artic le, however, represents the ownership of an idea. The 
ownership of an idea may stifle the evolution of ideas. 
Abraham Lincoln made a s imi lar argument in  February of 1 859, when he 
attempted to persuade a Jacksonvil le ,  l l l inois audience of the power that written 
language has for mankind. What Lincoln said can apply to the Internet as j ust the 
latest improvement in the evolution of communication : 
Writing-- the art (�{communicating thoughts to the mind, through the 
eye - is the great invention (�f the world. Great in The astonishing 
range oj'analysis and combination which necessari�v underlies the 
most crude and general conception o{it - great, ve1�v great in 
enabling us to converse with the dead, the absent, and the unborn, at  
all  distances oj'time and oj'.<,pace; and great, not on�v in its direct 
henefhv, hut greatest help, to all other inventions. Suppose the art, 
with all conception o{it, were this day lost to the world. how long, 
think you, would it he, hefhre even Young A merica could get up the 
Iefier A . with any adequate notion of' using it to advantage? . . .  8 
The Internet, Lincoln might argue, remarkably ensures that great, and vi le,  
ideas are accessible to even more people, and the evolution of ideas may benefit from 
this communication tool . 
The Internet has introduced new chal lenges to the world.  Improved features 
are outpacing the system ' s  bandwidth capabi l ities even when some parts of the world 
x Lincoln. Abraham. from his speech DisCIJ1'eries and lm·entions, deli vered February II, 1859 ,  i n  
.I acksonvi lie. I l l i nois. Cited from showcase.net ins.netiweb/creative/l incolnispeeches/discover ies.htm 
[ l ast vi sited February 1 5 , 2003]. 
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are sti l l  not "online." Different technologies for improved performance are jockeying 
for position-the race among satel l ite downlinks,  dial-up access, cable modems, and 
fiber-optics ,  and the relative efficiency of each, has not as yet produced a c learly 
decisive standard for l inking to the World Wide Web. Less conspicuous than the 
advancing technology, the law also is evolving to try to meet these new cyberspace 
chal lenges. 
B. Theory and Methodology 
This  study of the init ial effects of two major sections of the Digi tal 
Mi l lennium Copyright Act of 1 998 uses traditional approaches of l egal research and 
legal h istory. Theory, in the special ized lexicon of thi s study, i s  used to mean 
constitutional principles of copyright law as interpreted by courts and by scholars of 
constitutional and intel lectual property law. Textual analysi s of arguments made by 
legislators during hearings leading to the passage of the DMCA was also useful  here. 
Analysis is offered of Sections 5 1 2  and 1 20 1  of the DMCA. Those DMCA sections, 
as enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Bi l l  Cl inton, are analyzed .  
This thesi s  attempts to  outl ine the tensions involved in  balancing the paired interests 
embedded in the Copyrights and Patents Clause of the Constitution of the United 
States. E fforts to find that uneasy balance point in Congress and in court decisions 




Chapter I I : F inding the 'Spi rit' of the U.S. Copyright Act 
The h istory of copyright has been an interplay between 'new conditions and 
purposes'  and 'mi schievous' technology, with law and social understanding 
repeatedly interacting in novel patterns.9 
In  1 998, Congress enacted the Digital M il lennium Copyr ight Act (DMCA), 
the l atest amendment to the nation ' s  often-amended Copyr ight Law. Thi s body of 
law-one of the oldest pieces of legi slation in  the history of the United States-was 
passed in 1 790 (before the Bi l l  of Rights was even proposed in Congress and wel l 
before the Bi l l  of Rights was finally ratified on December 1 5 , 1 79 1  ) .  The DMCA was 
"Congress ' s response to the ostensible pl ight of copyr ight owners ,  faced, they argued, 
with ruin by the prospect of massive infr ingement of digital infonnation products ." 1 0  
I n  thi s  case, "digita l  information products" meant the Internet, and more pointedly, 
the ease of mass copying enabled by the Internet. 1 1  
The Copyr ight Act has seen numerous changes, usual ly in  response to 
technological advancements. 1 2  And some of those advancements, like the Internet, 
9 Lawrence. John Shelton. and Bernard Timberg. Fair Use and Free lnquil�\·, Ablcx Publ ish ing 
Corporation, Norwood. New Jersey. pg. 4 ( 1 9R9) .  
1 0  Zimmerman.  Diane Leenhccr. Adrift in the Digital Millennium Coprright A ct: The Sequel. 
Univers i ty of Dayton L .  R .. Vol .  26. No.2.  pg 279 (200 1 ). 
11 Teeter. Dwight L . .  and B i l l  Loving. Law of' Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of' Print 
and Broadcast Media, I 0'11 cd .. Foundation Press, New York .  pg. 852  ( 200 I ) . lc Some of the U .S .  Copyright amendments i n  response to technologica l  advancements incl ude. 1 790 
books. maps and charts protected: I 802. designs. engra vings and etchings added: 1 83 1 .  musical 
composit ions added: I 856. rights of performance of dramatic works added: 1 865 .  photographs and 
negatives added: I 870. paint ings. statues and other fine arts added. right to translate or dramat ize 
granted to author: 1 909. rights of performance amended to include jukeboxes :  1 9 1 2 . motion pictures 
added: 1 952 .  publ ic  performances for profit and recording of nondramatic l i terary works added to 
author's rights: 1 976. copyright law amended to cover original  works of authorship fixed in  any 
tangible medium of expression. now known or later developed. from which they can be perceived. 
reproduced or otherwise communicated. e i ther d i rectly or with the aide of a machine or device. 
Exceptions incl ude works of i ndustrial design and type faces. from Loyola Un ive rsity Chicago. 
7 
have a lso enabled new capabi l i ties in mass copying. As copying becomes 
increasingly inexpensive and effective. copyright owners fear a loss of control of their 
own work. Likewise, society fears mass piracy wi l l  remove incentives for the nation's  
best minds to  explore intel lectual and creative frontiers. 
The DMCA estab l ished new law that is designed to protect the copyright 
owner from i l legal piracy on the Internet. The Internet is a particularl y  potent threat to 
copyright owners because the technology is digita l ,  and copying materia l  i s  
considered far more effective than i t  has been with previous technological 
advancements such as VCRs or audio cassette recorders. The Internet enables users to 
download text, photographs, movies, music,  or graphics with virtual ly  no degradation 
in quality. Furthermore, users could duplicate these fi l es by the mi l l ions  in short 
periods of time and sti l l  without s ign ificant effect on qual i ty. Final ly, the Internet also 
provided any lay person with an inexpensive. worldwide network, enabling not only 
mass copying, but a lso mass distribution. 
Congress sought to protect copyright owners from the new threat by enacting 
the DMCA. But in  effort to protect the copyright holder, did the DMCA go too far? 
Since the enactment of the DMCA, a host of crit ics have decried the legislation as 
suffering from unfocused overbreadth. Put another way, did Congress protect Article 
I, Section 8 of the Constitution at the expense of the First Amendment? 
Congress shal l  make no law respecting an establ ishment of rel i gion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
Copyright Highlights. http:i /www. luc.cdwrcsourccs;copyright/highl ights.html .  [ Last v i sited Apri 1 1 4, 
2002) . 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 1 3 
Furthermore, the spirit of copyr ight law has historical ly considered the 
encouragement of property owners with the cross-ferti l ization of new development in 
arts and sciences. 1 4  This thesis examines some of the contested issues within the 
DMCA. Of central importance is the DMCA 's upholding of the critical copyright 
balance. Does the DMCA uphold the original spirit of U .S .  copyright law? 
There are two sections of the DMCA that warrant particular attention, and it i s  
those two sections that are covered i n  this  thesi s .  First, Section 1 20 1 . Circumvention 
o.lcopyright protection systems, addresses electronic security devices that are used to 
protect copyrighted material on the I nternet. 15 These devices are often used to prevent 
unauthorized access to material-electronic books ,  music, pictures, movies, or any 
copyr ighted materia l .  Section 1 20 1  of the DMCA expl icit ly makes it i l legal to 
"circumvent"-or break into, or avoid, or disable-any security devices that protect 
copyr ighted material . 
Second, Section 5 1 2 , Limitations on liability relating to material online, 
addressed the role  of Internet service providers and online service providers in 
regards to potential copyright infringement l iability. 16 Section 5 1 2  a l lows ISPs and 
OSPs to take advantage of legal "safe harbors," where taking proper action when 
13  U.S .  Constitution, Amendment I .  
14 Nimmer, Melvi l le B . ,  Nimmer on Cop1-right. Vol . I 0. Lex is Nexis (2002).  Phi l l ip  Wittenberg. The 
Law 
o(Literary Proper(\' ( New York: World Publishing Co . . 1 957). pp. 45-456. 
]) 1 7  u.s.c. � 1 20 1 .  
16 1 7  u.s.c. � 5 1 2 . 
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confronted with copyrighted material on their sites-as prescribed by the DMCA-
can al leviate l iabi l i ty concerns for service providers . 
Both sections have been met with a fair share of criticism, much of i t  
concerning the potential threat these provi sions may make on  fair use  and First 
Amendment privi leges. In addition, crit ics suggest that these two provisions t i l t  
copyright balance in  favor of the copyright industry and to the detriment of the spirit 
of copyright law. 
A. The Spirit of Copyright 
Copyright l aw was first enacted in the United States of America in  1 790. 
Since that time. it has been continuously updated, rewritten, manipulated, and 
amended in an effort to address new and never-before-thought-of appl ications of the 
law, most often as a result of technological advancements. 1 7 With all of that change in 
copyright law, the one constant seems to be the spirit of the law itself. 
The men who sat in the first Congress of the United States borrowed 
substantial ly from the Engl i sh when enacting copyright legis lation. But fortunately 
for the Americans. the Engl ish had first advanced and refined their own concept of 
copyright law before the United States adopted it. The Engl ish had enjoyed copyright 
protection for centuries, although the purpose initial ly  was more about royal 
censorship than protection of authors' royalties.1x Parl iament implemented copyright 
as far back as the 1 51 11 Century, some two hundred years before the Americans 
17 Sec genera l ly.  N immer. Melv i l le  B . . Nimmer on CoplTight. Vol .  I 0 .  Lex is Nexis  ( 2002) .  Sec also 
supra note 1 2 . 
tx Stewart. Dr. Stephen M . . Two Hundred Years of English Copvright Law .. The American Bar 
Association. Chicago ( 1 977 ) .  
10  
estab l i shed copyrights. Quite d ifferent in  spirit  from today ' s  copyright laws, the ear ly  
Engl i sh laws provided pr inters with exclusive r ights to  publ i sh particular 
documents-laws that did much to promulgate the authorized documents of the 
1 9  monarchy and perhaps not so much for authors o f  work.  
With the invention of moveable type, mass copying of material became at  
once practical and threatening. In 1 476, the Brit ish crown assigned exclusive l i censes 
to printers ,  "openly  expressing the monarchy's fears of widespread pol itical and 
theological heresy."20 By 1 636 Engl i sh copyright law plainly announced its 
under lying principal: 
That no person or per sons whatsouer shall presume to print, or cause 
to bee pr inted, either in  the parts beyond the Seas, or in  this Real me . . .  
any seditious, scismatical l ,  or offensive Bookes or Pamphlets, to the 
scandal l of Reli gion, or the Church, or the Government, or Governours 
of the Church or State . . .  2 1 
Clearly, the 1 636 Act was not about protecting printers '  ownership r ights. 
Instead, i t  was aimed at protecting government from the dangers of unregulated 
expression. By 1 709, the Engl i sh had s ignificantly updated intel lectual property l aw 
with the Statute of 8 Anne, which final ly provided authors legal r ight to their own 
work. But emphasis remained on control ,  even though the Statue of 8 Anne did pay 
some attention to establ i shing '"the Encouragement of learned M en to compose and 
write useful  Books .  '"22 
1 9  . See supra note 9, pg. 5 .  0() - See supra note 9, page 4 .  
, I - See supra note 9, page 4 .  22 Sevi l le .  Catherine. Literarr Copvright Refilrm In Ear/v Victorian England. Cambr idge University 
Press. page I 0 ( 1 999). 
II 
"Whereas printers, booksel lers, and other persons have of late 
frequently taken the l iberty of printing, reprinting, and publi shing, or 
causing to be printed, reprinted and publ ished, books and other 
writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such 
books and writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the 
ruin of them and their fami l ies: 
For preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for the 
encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful 
books . . .  That from and after the tenth day of Apri l ,  One thousand 
seven hundred and ten, the author of any book or books already 
printed . . .  shall have the sole right and l iberty of printing such book 
and books for the term of one and twenty years . 23" 
It was this law that influenced early ci tizens of the new republ ic ,  encouraging 
them to seek ways to protect intellectual production . Protecting authors ' rights i n  
order to  provide them with proper incentives in  order to  benefit society through the 
transmission of knowledge and art was a factor in establ i shing copyright law, as may 
be seen in the wording of the enabling provision in the United States Constitution, 
Article I, Section 8 ,  as quoted above at footnote 5. However, i t  has not been a 
foregone concl usion that copyright law by itself wi l l  ensure proper incentive to 
"learned Men." 
Close examination of early copyright debate unearths dichotomous principles. 
First, copyright law itself is  generally regarded as l aw designed to protect original 
material from piracy, thereby al lowing the producers of the material to earn a profit 
for their work . With proper incentive in place to generate new material , society at 
large benefits from increased cerebral production in  arts and sciences. However, 
crit ics argue that it is copyright protection itself'that may stifle the advancement of 
society. 
12 
In  1 785 ,  Lord Chief Justice Mansfield posed the question of copyright as  
balancing opposing i nterests: 
"We must take care to guard against the two extremes equal ly 
prejudicial ; the one that men of abi l i ty, who have employed their t ime 
for the service of the community may not be deprived of their just 
merits and reward for their ingenuity and labor; the other that the 
world may not be deprived of improvements nor the progress of the 
arts retarded. 24" 
When the Engl i sh reexamined their copyright law in 1 842. for example, crit ics 
of copyright law expressed "genuine fears that a strengthened copyright law would 
halt the di ssemination of knowledge."25 American l awmakers considered the same 
conundrum after the 1 909 Copyright amendment : 
In  enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . .  two questions :  
First, how much wil l  the legi slation stimulate the producer and so 
benefit the publ ic ,  and second, how much wil l  the monopoly granted be 
detrimental to the publ ic?26 
However, thi s  fear of creating a monopolistic beast was less pronounced, or 
perhaps even unpersuasive when copyright was first considered as a national law in 
America.  In early 1 780s America, a young New York schoolteacher had grown 
unhappy with the only avai lable textbooks on Engl i sh grammar. America was at war 
with England, and the already inadequate Brit ish books were now becoming scarce .  
As a result, the enterpri sing teacher, Noah Webster, penned his own textbook, one 
23 Statute of Anne (8 Anne. c. 1 9). from Benjamin Kaplan and Ralph Brown. Casi's on Copyright, The 
Foundation Press. N ew York, Append ix  G. page 9R5 ( 1 974 ) .  
2 4  Seltzer. Leon E . ,  Exi'mptions And Fair Usi' In  Copyright: The Exclusive Rights Tensions in the 1976 
Copyright Act, Harvard University Press. page 1 3  ( 1 977) .  from 1 East 36 1 n .. 1 02 Eng. Rep. 1 39 n .  1 6-
1 R (K .B .  1 7115 ) .  
2� See supra note 2 2 .  page 1 2 . 
'6 - Si'e supra note 24. page I 0.  
that encompassed not just grammar but also spell ing and reading. When A 
Grammatical Institute ofthe English Language was nearly complete ( i t  eventual ly 
sold mi l l ions of copies, 70 mi l l ion by 1 900)27 , Webster sought to protect his  
investment from piracy. But young American law was i l l -equipped to protect 
intel lectual property. 
Although by the time Webster was finishing h is  text the United States'  
Articles of Confederation had been drafted, and no provi sions for copyright 
protection were included . n The United S tates was borrowing from some Engli sh law, 
but copyright protection was not current ly under congressional consideration--a lack 
of pol icy that was very apparent to Webster and some of his contemporaries.  
Perhaps influenced by the Engl i sh Statute of 8 Anne, which turned copyright 
protection from printers back to writers, Noah Webster appealed for copyright 
protection in Philadelphia in 1 782 .  With New Jersey and Pennsylvania assembl ies out 
of session, Webster 's  appeal for general copyright protection was thwarted. After 
meeting with the New Jersey governor, even state copyright protection seemed 
l .k I "') un 1 e y. � 
That same year, the British-American writer and phi losopher Thomas Paine 
marked a need for general copyright protection. '"It may, with propriety, be 
remarked, that in all countries where l iterature is (protected, and i t  never can flourish 
where it is  not , )  the works of an author are his legal property; and to treat l etters i n  
c7 Goldstein. PauL Copyright's Highway: From Gutt'nherg to the Celestial Jukebox, H i l l  and Wang, 
N ew York. pg. 5 1  ( 1 994) .  
cK /hid. 
c'l Bugbee. Bruce W . . The Genesis OfAmerican Patent A nd Copyright Law. Publi c  Affa irs Press, 
Washi ngton D.C. pages I 06- 1 07 ( 1 967) .  
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any other l ight than this ,  i s  to banish them from the country, or strangle them in the 
birth."' Paine went on to appeal for author protection in the new world ,  which was as 
yet without a constitution. 
"The state of l iterature in America must one day become a subject of 
legislative consideration .  H itherto i t  hath been a dis interested 
volunteer in the service of the Revolution, and no man thought of 
profits; but when peace shall give time and opportunity for study, the 
country wil l  deprive i tself of the honour and service of letters, and the 
improvement of science, unless sufficient laws are made to prevent 
depredation on l iterary property. I t  is wel l worth remarking, that 
Russia, who, but a few years ago, was scarcely known in Europe, owes 
a large share of her present greatness to the close attention she has 
paid, and the wise encouragement she has given to every branch of 
science and learning: and we have almost the same instance in  France, 
. h . f L  . XIV "10 m t e re1gn o oms . · 
In thi s  appeal i t  i s  worth noting a conspicuous omission of thought. At the 
time of h is  writing, Paine surely was considering the Engl i sh Statue of 8 Anne as a 
model for future American consideration. Noah Webster must a lso have been 
influenced by the Engl i sh law. However, the Statute of 8 Anne approached the 
subject of balancing the protection of authorship with the potentia l ly damaging 
outcome of establ i shing a monopoly. The Engl i sh law "hedged its grant of exclusive 
rights by  providing that anyone thinking a book too high priced could bring an action 
before a tribunal with the power to lower the price and to fine the bookse1 1er. "3 1 
Before the copyright was established in general U . S .  law, nearly every 
individual state had adopted its own copyright protections, five of the states based 
30 Ibid, page I 05 .  
31 See supra note 24.  page II. 
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copyright c losely on the Engl i sh Statute of 8 Anne, with "provi sions for state controls 
of access to copyrighted works, or their pri ces, or both. "�2 
Undaunted by early fai lures to establ i sh protection, Webster shared his 
textbook manuscript with Samuel Stanhope Smith, the president of Princeton 
University. Impressed with Webster 's  work, and eager to support the encouragement 
of such projects, Smith wrote a letter of recommendation. "Men of industry or of 
talents in any way, have a right to the property of their productions; and i t  encourages 
invention and improvement to secure i t  to them by certain laws, as has been practiced 
in European countries with advantage and success. And it i s  my opinion that it can be 
of no evi l  consequence to the state, and may be of benefit to it ,  to vest, by a law, the 
sole right of publ i shing and vending such works in the authors of them."�3 
Armed with thi s  letter, Webster approached the state of Connecticut, where he 
was encouraged by news of that state granting Andrew Law personal copyright 
protection for five years for his collection of songs . Webster addressed the 
Connecticut legi slature. 
32 Ibid. 
"I have been indefatigable thi s  winter; I have sacrificed ease, pleasure, 
and health to the execution of it ,  and have nearly completed i t .  But 
such close appl ication is too much for my constitution.  I must 
rel inquish the school or writing grammars. I shall not pursue the plan 
any further, unless i t  shall meet with publ ic approbation, 
encouragement, and securi ty. On the deci sion, therefore, of these two 
legislatures [Webster was a lso applying to the New York Government] 
depends the further prosecution of my design . . .  An attention to 
l iterature must be the principal bulwark against the encroachments of 
civi l and ecclesiastical tyrants, and American Liberty can die only with 
her Maecenases. America must be as independent in l i terature as she i s  
33 See supra note 29 .  
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in  Politics,  as famous for arts as for arms; and it i s  not impossible but a 
person of my youth may have some influence in  exciting a spirit of 
I . . d ,14 Iterary 111 ustry. · 
In Webster' s ,  Paine's  and Smith ' s  letters, we see a general appeal for the 
protection of authorship and no consideration for the danger of monopoly, as  
expressed in  Engl i sh l aw.  The need for protecting i ntel lectual pursuit seemed to be 
paramount. 
In January of 1 783 ,  Connecticut granted a copyright to Webster, "An Act for 
the Encouragement of literature and Genius ." The Act declared "it i s  perfectly 
agreeable to the Principles of natural E quity and Justice, that every Author should be 
secured in receiving the Profits that may ari se from the Sale of his Works, and such 
Security may encourage Men of learning and Genius to publ i sh their Writings; which 
may do Honor to their Country, and Service to M ankind."35 Three months later, 
America began the task of considering national copyright, led by writers-not 
booksellers-in a battle for legislation that was more hotly contested whether or not 
the power of copyright should reside with the states or with the federal government.36 
Joel Barlow, a poet and former Yale c lassmate of Webster' s, may have helped 
the committee draw an opinion on national copyright. 
"[N]othing is more properly a man ' s  own than the fruit of his study, 
and that the protection and security of l i terary property would great ly 
tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries and to the 
general extension of arts and commerce."17 
The committee' s  recommendation on May 2 of that year read: 
'4 See supra note 29, pg. I 08.  
35 Ibid. 
36 See supra note 27, pg. 5 1 .  
37 · See supra note 29. page 1 1 3 .  
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''Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states, to secure to 
the authors or publi shers of any new books not hitherto printed, being 
citizens of the United States. and to their. . .  executors , administrators 
and assigns, the copyright of such books for a certain time not less 
than fourteen years from the first publ ication; and to secure to the said 
authors, if they sha l l  survive the first term mentioned, and to their. . .  
executors, admini strators and assigns, the copyright of such books for 
another term of time not less than fourteen years, such copy or 
exclusive right of printing, publ i shing and vending the same, to be 
secured to the original authors, or pub l ishers, or. . .  their executors, 
admini strators and assigns, by such laws and under restri ctions as to 
the several states may seem proper." 
As a recommendation to the states, thi s  was the first known venture of the 
United States Government into the realm of intel lectual property. 18 At nearly the 
same time, Massachusetts fol lowed Connecticut ' s  l ead on March 1 7 . 
"Whereas the Improvement of Knowledge, the Progress of 
Civil ization, the publ ic Weal of the Community, and the Advancement 
of H uman Happiness, greatly  depend on the Efforts of learned and 
ingenious Persons in the various Arts and Sciences: As the principal 
Encouragement such Persons can have to make great beneficial 
Exertions of this Nature must exist in  the legal Security of the Fruits of 
their Study and Industry to themselves; and as such Security i s  one of 
the natural Rights of al l  Men, there being no Property more pecul iarly 
a Man ' s  own than that which i s  produced by the Labour of his Mind:  
Therefore, to encourage learned and ingenious Persons to write useful 
Books for the Benefit of Mankind, 
Be it enacted . . .  That al l  Books, Treati ses, and other Literary Works, 
having the Name or Names of the Author or Authors thereof printed 
and publ i shed with the same, sha l l  be the sole property of the said 
Author or Authors, being Subjects of the United States of America, 
their Heirs and Assigns, for the ful l  and compleat Term of Twenty-one 
Years , from the Date of their first Publication. "19 
St i l l ,  pressure to enact general copyright protection did not completely 
obscure weighing the need for publ ic access. Early  copyright provisions included 
>x See supra note 29. page 1 1 3 .  
1 9  s· 29 · ee supra note . page 1 1 4. 
strict guidel ines for establ i shing length of copyright tenn, an obvious 
acknowledgement that copyright law could be given too much power. 
At the Constitutional Convention, matters turned to i ssues of intel lectual 
property law on August 1 8 , 1 787 .  James M adison proposed, among other things : 
"To secure l i terary authors their copy rights for a l imited time 
"To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful 
k I d d d .  . ,40 now e ge an 1 scovenes. 
Charles Pinckney, also a member of the Continental Congress offered: 
"To grant charters of incorporation 
"To grant patents for usefu l  inventions 
"To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a . . .  certain time."4 1  
I n  The Federal ist Papers, Madison described the power of copyright and with 
it a justification for i ts prominent placement as a constitutional provision. 
"The uti l ity of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britian . . .  The publ ic 
good ful ly  coincides . . .  with the claims of individuals ."4� 
Clearly, copyright was a considerable need for a new country, a right that 
would help ensure that America was a front runner in the marketplace of ideas. 
However, these early pronouncements did l ittle to directly confront the possible 
danger that an overly powerful copyright law may pose. Beyond copyright term 
l imits, there was l ittle  publ ic di scourse regarding the balance of copyright power with 
the right of publ ic  access . Over the years, American courts were faced with the 
problem of balancing these two elements . 
40 Madison's Notes, Saturday, A ugust 18, 1787, www.thi snat ion.com!l ibrary/madison:a ueust-l X .htmL 
[last vi sited March 1 7. 2003] .  
41  See supra note 29.  page 1 26. 
4c Samuels, Edward, The IllustraTed Storr o(Coprrighr. Thomas Dunne Books. St. Martin's Press. pg. 
1 4  (2000). 
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"In short, we must often in  deciding questions of this sort, look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the 
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale 
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original 
k ,43 wor . 
"The enactment of copyright l egislation by Congress under the terms 
of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author 
has in h is  writings, . . .  but upon the ground that the welfare of the public 
wi l l  be served and progress of science and u seful  arts wi l l  be promoted 
by securing to authors for l imited periods the exclusive rights to their . . ,44 wntmgs. 
"Copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of 
knowledge . . .  The scheme establ ished by the Copyright Act . . .  foster[s] 
the original works that provide the seed and substance of this harvest. 
The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors 
to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors . ' '45 
"The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither 
unlimited nor primari ly  designed to provide a special benefit .  Rather, 
the l imited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may 
be achieved. It i s  intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors . . .  by the provision of a special reward, ad to al low the public 
access to the products of their genius after the l imited period of 
exclusive control has expired."46 
"The primary objective of copyright i s  not to reward the labor of 
authors, but 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . '  To 
thi s  end, copyright assures authors the right in  their original 
expression, but encourages others to bui ld freely upon the ideas and 
. .. . d b  k "47 m,ormatwn conveye y a wor . 
"The copyright law, l ike the patent statute, makes reward to the owner 
a secondary consideration. Although the primary purpose of the 
copyright law is to foster creation and dissemination of intellectual 
works for publ ic welfare, it  also has an important secondary purpose: 
. n  Folsom\'. Marsh. 9 F .  Cas. 342 [C.C.D. Mass. 1 R4 1 ] ,  from Gretchen McCord H offmann, Copyright 
in C\'benpace. Nea1-Schuman Netguide Series, New York, page 26 ( 200 1 ). 
44 H . R .  Rep. No. 2222. 60' 11 Cong . .  2d Sess . . 7 ( 1 909) 
4' TH·entieth Centur\' Music Corp. v. A iken. 422 U .S .  1 5 1 ,  1 56 ( 1 975 ) .  
46 Som· Corp. \'. Uni1·ersal Cit\' Studios, Inc. 464 U .S .  4 1 7 , 430-3 1 ( 1 9X4 ) .  
47 Feist Puhliction. Inc. \'. Rural Telephone Se1Tice Co . . 499 U .S .  340, 349-50 ( 1 99 1  ) .  
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To give authors the reward due them for their contribution to 
. , ,48 SOCiety. 
One particular case i l lustrates especial ly wel l thi s  power struggle between 
copyright protection and fair use. In the early 1 960s, Random House hired a writer to 
create a book-length biography on the l i fe of Howard Hughes, a giant in America ' s  
aviation, oi l and motion picture industries. H ughes, a devoutly private man, protested 
the writing of the biography, suing Random House for copyright infringement, 
claiming he had "prima facie" copyright ownership of the story. To substantiate that 
claim, just five days earl ier Hughes had bought Look magazine articles that were 
publ i shed years before on Hughes'  l ife. With that purchase, H ughes attempted to 
claim copyright ownership of the story of his l i fe, arguing he "owned" the copyright 
to the story, effectively stopping anyone from writing the story again. On the other 
hand, Random House argued that writing the H ughes story amounted to fair use of 
factual information. And after a trial court and a district court found in favor of 
Hughes, a Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Random House. Circuit Judge 
Leonard P. Moore, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals noted, 
" . . .  there can be l i ttle doubt that portions of the Look article were 
copied. Two direct quotations and eight-l ine paraphrase were 
attributed to Stephen White, the author of the articles.  A mere reading 
of the Look articles, however, indicates that there is considerable 
doubt as to whether the copied and paraphrased matter constitutes a 
material and substantial portion of those articles. 
Furthennore, while the mode of expression employed by White is 
entitled to copyright protection, he could not acquire a monopoly in 
the narration of hi storical events .49" 
4s See Supra note 24, pg. 1 4. from Register of Copyrights. �7'11 Cong., 1 51 Sess . . Copyright Law 
Re1·ision. Report on the General Revi sion of the U .S .  Copyright Law 5 ( H ouse J udiciary Comm. Print 
1 96 1  ) .  
4 9  See supra note 1 1 . pg .  � 5 7-�5�.  
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With the landmark 1 976 Copyright Act, copyright law had achieved a 
monumental change in  language. For the first time, the American Copyright Act 
acknowledged the balance between protection of authorship and freedom of access to 
information. 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified 
[by Section 1 06] , for purposes such as critic ism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. 50 
The Act was met with some critic ism,5 1 but clearly the legislation did not 
inject new pol icy so much as it substantiated that copyright itself was a struggle 
between author reward and publ ic access to information. 
The purpose of copyright has been debated as either a guarantee of incentive 
for creativity, or a means for promoting the "Progress of Science and Usefu l  Arts ."52 
The two concepts are probably not mutual ly exclusive. However, one can argue that 
copyright law is both a savior and a detriment to creativity. 
Certainly if  creative work is pirated and distributed without benefit to the 
creator, then the introduction of new creativity is threatened. However, consider the 
possibi l ity that copyright law itself has extingui shed creativity that has been inspired 
by some previous creation. For example, Walt Di sney recently lobbied to extend 
'0 Oler, H arriet L.. Cop1-right Law and the Fair Usl:' of Visual Images. Ch. 2 1 ,  page 272 of Fair Usl:' 
and Free Inqui1y." Edited by John Shelton Lawrence and Bernard Timberg, Ablex Publ i sh i ng 
Corporation. New Jersey ( 1 9XO) . 
'1 Sei:' supra note 24.  As Seltzer claimed, "The notion of fair use demarcates a territory for debate 
among confl icting interests. rather than providing a ready means for resolving them." 
�= Sei:' supra note 4 7. 
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copyright protection for some of its characters . 5� Nearing the end of its copyright 
protection on several characters including Steamboat Wi l l ie, P luto, Goofy, and 
Donald Duck, Di sney acted to protect i ts cash cattle. "Rather than al low Mickey and 
friends to enter the public domain, Disney and its friends-a group of Hol lywood 
studios, music label s, and PACs representing content owners-told  Congress that 
they wanted an extension bi l l  passed."54 Congress did pass the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act 55 (upheld in Eldred v. Ashcroft) granting the term of protection 
"by 20 years for works copyrighted after January 1 ,  1 923 .  Works copyrighted by 
individuals since 1 978 got ' l ife plus 70' rather than the existing ' l i fe plus 50 . ' Works 
made by or for corporations (referred to as 'works made for hire ' )  got 95 years. 
Works copyrighted before 1 978 were shielded for 95 years, regardless of how they 
were produced."56 
Thi s kind of seemingly perpetual fortress of copyright law may do as much 
damage to the encouragement of creativity as it does to protect it. Imagine if new 
characters or new stories were developed (or could have already been developed) 
using M ickey as inspiration or as a starting point. The overwhelming popularity of the 
Walt Disney company almost assures that any new general-appeal chi ldren ' s  theme 
wi l l  have a virtual ly  insurmountable chal lenge to overcome Walt Disney's  monopoly. 
)) Eldred \'. Ashcrofi. 239 F .  3d 3 72 (2003 ) .  
) 4  Sprigman. ChriS: The A1ouse That A te The Puhlic Domain: Disnev. The Copvright Term Extension 
A ct, And Eldred\'. Ashcrofi, writ.news.fi ndlaw.com/commcntary/20020305 _sprigman.html (March 5 , 
2002) ,  [ last vi sited April 2. 2003] .  
" 1 7  U.S .  C. � I 0 1 .  The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act .  
' 6  See supra note 54 .  
23  
Granted, Di sney has achieved success because of its own contribution to 
creative genius. But copyright law in perpetuity may in  fact now stifle new creative 
genius, due in part to Disney' s domination of the genre. 
The desire to achieve improved society through inte l lectual contribution i s  the 
task of copyright law. That task is achieved by guaranteeing proper balance between 
the protection needs of authors , and the guarantee of freedom of information for the 
publ ic .  With the coming popul arity of the Internet, copyright law again faced 
amendment. How has the latest round of copyright evolution considered thi s  balance 
of power? 
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Chapter Ill: B i rth of the Digital Mille n n i um Copyright Act 
The DMCA was the U .S .  Congress'  answer to the danger that digi tal media 
posed to copyright law.5 7  But the DMCA was not a sudden amendment built from 
scratch. It has roots much deeper than the Spring 1 998 Senate hearings. 58 Some of the 
amendments found in the DMCA can be traced back to the early 1 990s. 
In February 1 993,  the Cl inton Admini stration responded to the growth of the 
Internet when it formed the Information Infrastructure Task Force ( I ITF) "to 
implement the Administration ' s  vision for the National Information Infrastructure 
(NI I ) ."5'J For simplification, "Nil" refers almost exclusively to the Internet, as noted 
in the I ITF report.60 The I ITF worked with "the private sector, publ ic interest groups, 
Congress, and State and local governments to develop comprehensive 
telecommunications and information pol icies and programs that wi l l  promote the 
development of the Nil and best meet the country' s needs ."6 1  
This prel iminary investigation led to the formation of  a Working Group on 
Intel lectual Property Rights, Chaired by Bruce Lehman, Assi stant Secretary of 
'7 Senator Joh n  Ashcroft (R-MO). Senate floor debate on S .  2037, the Digital M i l lenni um Copyright  
Act  ( May 14 ,  l 99R): "Thi s  legislat ion (the DMC A )  i s  about updati ng the copyright laws for the digital 
age and preparing a sizable portion of our economy for the next century . . , 
:;x U.S .C.C. A . N .  1 0 5'11 Cong . . 2"d S. ( l 99R). 
5 9  Intellectual Proper(v and the National !nj(Jrmation lnfi·astructure: The Report of the Working Group 
on lnrellectual Proper(v Rights. Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks Cha ir. fn/imnation !nfi·astructure Task Force. Ronald H .  Brown. Secretary 
of Commeree. Cha ir. Sept. 1 995 .  The Nil could now be more aptly named the G i l  (Global Information 
Infrastructure)  as predicted by former Vice President AI Gore in  Remarks Prepared for Del i very at the 
I nternat ional Telecommunicat ions U nion in Buenos A i res. Argent i na (March 2 1 , 1 994). 
60 'The 'Nat ional I nformation I nfrastructure' as  i t  is d i scussed in th i s  Report. encompasses digi ta l ,  
i nteract ive services now avai l able. such as the I nternet . . .  [A] currently funct ion ing structure lends i tse lf  
more readi l y  to legal analysis than a hypothetical construct based on future developments." The I IT F  
report a lso reserves the notion that N i l  could apply t o  technology "contemplated for the fut ure." 
61 /hid. 
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Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Chair.('2 The Work ing 
Group began evaluating these special interest groups in the fal l  of 1 993,  in which it 
invited testimony regarding the N i l  through a publ i c  hearing and sol icited feedback.6� 
From those responses, the Working Group released a draft "Green Paper" i n  the 
summer of 1 994, which was distributed by the thousands in paper form and on the 
J I TF Internet site .  In response to the Green Paper, the Working Group received nearly 
a half mi l l ion individual comments by the fol lowing fal l .  
The Working Group outl ine of  Internet potential did not overlook the need to 
maintain public access to information . In September of 1 994, the Working Group 
sponsored a "Conference on Fair Use" (CONFU), which al lowed both copyright 
owners as well as users of copyrighted works to discuss fai r  use. In addition, the 
report acknowledged the need for the N i l  to support education systems and di stance 
learning. In particular detaiL the report recognized, among other things, the Internet' s  
potential to increase health care awareness for both patients and health care 
professional s .  
But whi le  acknowledging these fears , the report s imultaneously predicted the 
fai lure of the copyright industry to use the I nternet, predicting, for example, that 
authors wi l l  be "wary" of entering the I nternet market for fear of piracy. They also 
conceded that thi s piracy i s  not el iminated by a copyright owner's refusal to distribute 
C•c Bruce Lehman. Assi stant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 
Chair. 1 992- 1 9911 .  
63  A "wide variety'" of contributors to the discussion regarding development of the report i nc luded 
"'various electronic industries. service providers. the academic, research, l ibrary and legal communit ies. 
and individual creators. copyright owners and users. as well as the computer software. motion p icture. 
music. broadcasting. publi shi ng and other i nformation and entertai nment industries." l lTF  Report. 
page 5 .  
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his work onl ine. Any unauthorized uploading of the work wi l l  result in  the same 
piracy. This, the report reasoned, could severely l imit the growth of the Internet. In  a 
bold assertion that tied Internet success or fai lure to U .S .  legislation, the report 
claimed "The public wil l  not use the services avai lable on the Nil and generate the 
market necessary for its success unless a wide variety of works are avail able under 
equitable and reasonable  terms and conditions, and the integrity of those works i s  
assured."64 
After a substantial review of the Nil as it stood in 1 995,  the Report outl ined 
various recommendations for updating copyright law. Four of these recommendations 
deal specifi cal ly with the topic of thi s thesis .  These same four recommendations 
would eventual ly receive a spot in the Digi tal Mi l lennium Copyright Act.65 
I .  1 20 1  Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems. 
No Person shall import, manufacture or distribute any device, product, or 
component incorporated i nto a device or product, or offer or perform any service, 
the primary purpose or effect of which i s  to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or 
otherwise circumvent, without the authority of the copyright owner or the law, 
any process, treatment, mechani sm or system which prevents or inhibits the 
violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under Section 1 06.  
2 .  1 202 Integrity of Copyright M anagement Information. 
a .  No person shal l  knowingly provide copyright management information that i s  
fal se, or  knowingly publ icly di stribute or import for public distribution copyright 
management infonnation that is fal se. 
b .  No person sha l l ,  without authority of the copyright owner or the law, ( I )  
knowingly remove or alter any copyright management information, ( i i )  knowingly 
di stribute or import for di stribution copyright management information that has 
been altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law, or ( i i i )  
knowingly di stribute or import for di stribution copies or phonorecords from 
which copyright management infom1ation has been removed without authority of 
the copyright owner or the law. 
c .  As used in  thi s  chapter, "copyright management information" means the name 
and other identifying information of the author of a work, the name and other 
M See supra note 59 .  
(,) 1 7  U .S .C � 1 20 1 .  1 202. 1 203 , and 1 204 . 
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identifying information of the copyright owner, terms and conditions for uses of 
the work, and such other information as the Regi ster of Copyrights may prescribe 
by regulation. 
3. 1 203 Civil Remedies. 
Any person injured by a violation of Sec. 1 20 I or 1 202 may bring a civil action in 
an appropriate United States district court for such violation. 
4. 1 204 Criminal Offenses and Penalties. 
Any person who violates Section 1 202 with intent to defraud sha l l  be fined not 
more than $500,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.66 
In addition, the report made two recommendations that are also particularly 
relevant to this thesi s ,  "library exemptions," or rights of access to copyrighted works 
for fair use, and "technological protection," which did in fact result in a substantial 
amendment to the Copyright Act. 
Under "library exemptions," the Working Group Report .cited Section 1 08 of 
the 1 976 Copyright Act claiming it "clearly did not permit digital reproduction" as a 
form of Fair Use.67 However, the Report urged expansion of Fair Use to include 
digital copying by l ibraries "under certain circumstances." 
The Working Group asked Copyright Act lawmakers : 
1 .  To accommodate the reality of the computerized l ibrary by  al lowing the 
preparation of three copies of works in digital form, with no more than one copy 
in use at any time (while the others are archived) ;  
2 .  To recognize that the use of a copyright notice on a published copy of a work i s  
no longer mandatory; and 
3 .  To authorize the making of digital copies for purposes o f  preservation. 
Under "technological protection," the report recommended "the prohibition of 
devices, products, components and services that defeat technological methods of 
preventing unauthorized use i s  in the public interest and furthers the Constitutional 
purpose of copyright laws." An important caveat, however, a l lowed anyone to protect 
(,(J See supra note 59 .  
their work with security devices, regardless of fair use provisions . "The fair use 
doctrine does not require a copyright owner to al low or to faci l i tate unauthorized 
access or use of a work," the report explained. "If the circumvention device i s  
primaril y  intended and used for legal purposes, such as fair use ,  the device would not 
violate the provision, because a device with such purposes and effects would fal l  
under the "authorized by law" exemption."6x 
The need for copyright protection also was recognized outside the United 
States. In 1 996, the World Intel lectual Property Organization (WIPO)-"an 
international organization dedicated to promoting the use and protection of works of 
h h . .  "6') d I . h h 1 1  70 P d . t e uman spmt -convene to reso ve new copyng t c a enges. " ro uct10n 
centres [ sic] such as the European Union and the United States proposed that the 
conference . . .  deal with the chal lenges of digi tal technology."7 1 The conference, held 
in Geneva, Switzerland, resulted in two treaties, the "WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty,'' and the "WIPO Copyright Treaty." Both were l iberal ly adopted 
in the DMCA, but the latter "Copyright Treaty" contained recommendations that 
ultimately affected the i ssues discussed in this thesi s .  
Interestingly, much of the WIPO recommendations in  this section were quite 
simi lar to the Nil Working Group Report, described above. I t  was, after all, the 
United States that "proposed that digital transmissions be included within the scope of 
67 "Under this exemption. for example. a repository could make photocopies of manuscripts by 
m icrofi lm  or electrostatic process. but could not reproduce the work i n  ' machine-readable'  language 
for storage i n  an i nformation system." H . R .  at 75 .  U .S .C.C .A .N .  56119: Senate Report at 67 .  
6x See supra note 59 .  
69 About WIPO. www.wipo.org/about-wipo/cn/ [ last v isited Apri l  1 5 . 2003] .  
70 Arup. Chri stopher, The New World Trade Organization A greements: Globalizing Law Through 
Sen·ices and Intellectual Propertr. Cambridge Uni versity Pres�. page 274 (2000) .  
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a distribution right , as it had proposed to do within its own new national model ."72 
This recommendation most assuredly came directly  from the Working Group Report, 
completed only months earlier. 
After exposing the N i l  Report to the international community at the WIPO 
conference, attention turned back to amending U.S .  Copyright Law in accordance 
with the recommendations in the Report. In September 1 997, Bruce Lehman 
participated in two days of hearings designed to invite testimony regarding the 
proposal s in the WIPO conference treaties. 73 
In May of 1 998, Representative Howard Coble74 submitted the "WIPO 
Copyright Treaties Implentation and Online Copyright Infringement Liabil ity 
Limitation'' report to the Committee on the Judiciary. The report outl ined various 
7 1 /hid. page 276.  
n Ibid. 
n The hearings i ncl uded a wide variety of participants i ncluding Marybeth Peters. Register of 
Copyrights: Roy Neel .  CEO. U nited States Telephone Assoc:  Jack Valenti , CEO. Motion Picture 
Association of America: Robert Hol leyman. President. Busi ness Software A l l i ance: M . R .C .  
Greenwood. Chancel lor. University of  Cal i fornia. Santa Cruz on  behal f of the Association of  American 
Uni versit ies and Land Grant Colleges: Tushar Patel . V ice President and Managing Director. U SWeb: 
Lawrence Kenswi l .  Executive Vice President. Business and Legal Affai rs. Uni versal M usic Group: 
Marc J acobsen. General Counsel . Prodigy Services. I nc :  Ken Wasch. President. Software Publi shers 
Association : Ronald G. Dunn. President. I nformation I ndustry Association: John Bett is .  Songwriter. on 
beha l fof the American Society of Composers Authors and Publi shers: A l lee Wi l l i s. Songwriter. on 
behal f  of Broadcast Music. I nc :  Robert L. Oakley. Professor of Law. Georgetown Un iversity Law 
Center and Director. Georgetown Law Library. on behal f  of a Coal ition of Library and Educational 
Organizations: Johnny Cash. Vocal Artist. with H i l ary Rosen. President and CEO. Recording Industry 
Association of America: Al lan Adler. Vice President. Legal and Governmental A ffa irs. Associat ion of 
American Publ ishers: Gail M arkcls. Genera l  Counsel and Senior Vice President. I nteractive Digital 
Software Association :  M ike K i rk .  Executive Director. American I ntel l ectual Property Law 
Association: Thomas Ryan. President. SciTcch Software. I nc :  Mark Belinsky. Vice President. Coy 
Protection Group. Macrovision. I nc :  Douglas Bennett . President. Earlham Coll ege. Vice President. 
American Counci l  of Learned Societies. on beha lfof the Digital Future Coal i t ion:  Edward J. B lack, 
President. Computer and Communications I ndustry Association: Christopher Byrne. Director of 
I ntel lectual Property. S i l icon Graphics. I nc, on behal f of the I nformation Technology I ndustry Counci l :  
and Gary Shapiro. President. Consumer E lectronics Manufacturer's Association ( a  sector o f  the 
Electroni c  I ndustries Association). and Chairman, Home Recording R ights Coal i t ion . 
74 U.S .  Representative Howard Coble, ( R-NC). member of the subcommittee on Courts. the I nternet, 
and I ntel l ectual Property. 
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recommendations for updating the Berne Convention and improving copyright 
protection to meet the digital environment. 
Although the report acknowledged the need for maintaining a balance in  
copyright power, c learly the initiative of  the proposed legislation was weighted i n  
favor o f  protecting investment in  the Internet-thereby encouraging the Internet' s  
growth and usefulness. For example, the report ' s  premise was based upon the digital 
environment ' s  capabi l ity to al low users to "send and retrieve perfect reproductions of 
copyrighted material easi ly  and nearly instantaneously . . .  " But this potential benefit 
also was a clear and present threat, as recognized in the report ' s  pronouncement 
"[rapid reproduction]  will unfortunately also faci l i tate pirates who aim to destroy the 
I f.A . . II I ' ' 7' va ue o mencan mte ectua property. -
The report outl ined the need to outlaw anti-circumvention technology i n  order 
to curtail piracy, reasoning that much of the Internet ' s  copyright materia l  wi l l  be 
protected by security devices to prevent unauthorized copying  and di stribution . The 
proposed legislation would make it i l l egal to circumvent that security technology in  
order to  gain access to  copyrighted material . The report a lso acknowledged that anti-
circumvention legi slation must be approached cautiously, for fear of over-reaching. 
"While there are no objections to preventing piracy on the I nternet, i t  is not easy to 
draw the l ine between legitimate and non-legitimate uses of decoding  devices, and to 
account for devices which serve legitimate purposes ."76 To avoid that over-reaching, 
the report made i l l egal only devices "that ( I )  are primari ly  designed to grant free, 
75 WJPO Coprright Treaties implementation and Online Copyright lnfi-ingement Liabilitv Limitation. 
Rcpt . 1 05-55 1 .  P. l H . R .  228 1 .  page 9 (emphasis added) .  
7c' /hid. page I 0 .  
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unauthorized access to unauthorized works ;  (2 )  have only l imited commercial ly 
significant purpose or use other than to grant such free access; and (3) are 
intentional ly  marketed for use in granting such free access ." 7 7  
The report a lso addressed the need for l imiting the I iability of online service 
providers, establ i shing a clear difference between direct infringement and secondary 
l iabil ity. In an i l lustrative explanation, the report agreed with and "codified" the 
finding in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom.78 In that case, the Rel igious 
Technology Center owned copyright to work by L .  Ron Hubbard, the late founder of 
the Church of Scientology. Denni s Erl ich, a former minister of the Church of 
Scientology who became a bitter critic of the cult, posted some of H ubbard ' s  material 
on his own web site, alt .rel igion.scientology. To publ i sh his site, Erlich used Netcom, 
an Internet Service Provider. After fai l ing to convince Erlich to remove the material 
from his site, Religious Technology Center wrote a letter to Netcom asking them to 
pull the plug on alt .re l igion.scientology. Netcom asked for proof that the work was, in 
fact, copyright protected. When Rel igious Technology Center refused to provide 
proof, Netcom refused to pull the plug on Erl ich 's  site.  In the end, the court found in 
favor of Netcom, citing the need for plaintiffs to prove the exi stence of copyright. 
While the WIPO report was being developed, so was the DMCA. Floor 
statements involving content that would eventual ly become the DMCA began on July 
N . 29, 1 997 .  On the very same day, the text of H .R .  228 1 (the DMCA) were mtroduced 
77 /hid. 
n Religious Technology Center 1 '. Erlich. 907 F. Supp. 1 36 1  ( N . D. Cal .  1 995 ) .  
7 9  S. l l 2 1 .  WI PO Copyright and Per(omwnces and Phonogram.\ Treat\ Imp/entation Act ( .Ju ly 29.  
1 997) .  
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on the House floor. Ro Over the course of the ensuing fifteen months, the Act went 
through surprisingly few changes .  Of note are the differences between the House and 
Senate versions of the bi l l .  One such difference fal ls  under the anti-circumvention 
language, Section 1 20 I .  Again, the anti-circumvention provision was designed to 
outlaw the act of circumventing security devices that are designed to protect 
copyrighted works .  However, Section 1 20 1  did not specifical ly address the use of 
copyright protected work once circumvention has taken place. For that, the Senate 
report c learly explained that any action regarding specific misuse of the work would 
fal l  to "the protections embodied in  Title 1 7"  and not Section 1 20 1  of the DMCA. By 
contrast, the House report d id  not c larify this distinction. 
This seemingly trivial difference was made more prominent by Gary J. 
Shapiro in a hearing before a subcommittee of the House the fol lowing June.� 1 In that 
hearing, Shapiro, president and CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association, 
blasted some of the DMCA language for being imprecise and for what he described 
as disguising legi slative actions against technology as copyright enforcement. H2 As 
the Senate report explained, Section 1 20 1  is not actionable as a copyright 
infringement provi sion. Instead, it  outlaws devices used for circumventing copyright 
protection .  Therefore, according to Shapiro, fair usc of copyrighted material is made 
s o  H . R .  22X  L W I PO Copyright Treaty I mplementation Act ( J uly 2 9 ,  1 997 ) .  
X I  Statement of Gary .1 . Shapi ro. president and CEO of the Consumer Electronics Associat ion. before 
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications. Trade and Consumer Protection Committee on Commerce. 
U ni ted States H ouse of Representatives ( June 5, 1 99X) .  
xc !hid. I n  h is  report, Shapi ro said "While it may have originated i n  the J udiciary Committee. this 
legi slation is not rea l ly  about copyright . Whi le  amending Tit le 1 7  of the U .S .  Code. the bil l  does not 
amend the Copyright Act. and the acts prohibited by its terms are not tied to infringement of 
copyrights." 
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impossible, because the devices required to access the material in the first place are 
i l legal .  
Another noteworthy difference between the House and the Senate reports i s  
found in the Senate report ' s  Section 1 20 1  paragraph (d)(3 )-�no such paragraph i s  
found in the House report. That paragraph explains that "nothing in Section 1 20 1  
creates a mandate requiring manufacturers of consumer electronics, 
telecommunications, and computing products to design their products or their parts 
and components to respond to any particular technological measure employed to 
protect a copyrighted work."�13 The absence of thi s paragraph in the House report may 
have contributed to Shapiro ' s  remarks .  He testifies that " [the bi l l ]  would make 
designers of new devices, such as computers and VCRs, as well as high definition 
television sets and set top boxes, responsible for responding to and implementing any 
and all  technical anti-copy measures chosen by anyone who transmits a signal or 
distributes a program."x4 Ei ther Shapiro was unaware of thi s qual ifying statement in 
paragraph (d)(3 ) ,  or he found i t  legal ly  unsubstantial . To frame this debate in an 
example, suppose a cable television station transmitted its s ignal in a scrambled 
format. Only subscribers to that cable station could receive the s ignal unscrambled 
through technology provided by the cable station. Suppose al so, that a new television 
manufacturer bui l t  a set that just so happened to descramble that cable station ' s  
si!:,1Jlal . Would the televi sion manufacturer be  l iable under the DMCA Section 1 20 1 ?  
x:; R .  1 05- 1 90. 1 05'h Cong . .  2d Sess., � 1 20 1  (d ) (3 ) .  Senate Report. The Digital M il lenn ium Copyright 
Act of 1 998 ( May I I . 1 998 ) .  
x4 Sec supra note 8 1 .  page 4 .  
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The Senate report para!,rraph ( d) (3)  seems to exonerate the TV manufacturer. 
However, Shapiro claims the manufacturer would in fact be liable under 1 20 1 . 
In  summary, Shapiro recommended three changes to the DMCA: 
1 .  Clear language stating that the bi l l  does not mandate that a product 
respond to any particular technological protection measure. 
2.  A definition of 'technological protection measure' that works in the real 
world .  Shapiro proposed two solutions, the encryption/scrambling/secure 
watermark approach in H .R .  3048;  or a measure developed through a 
consensus-based process involving al l  interested parties. 
3 .  A n  exemption for both product manufacturers and product servicers to 
al low them to adjust products so as to mitigate noticeable adverse effects 
on the authorized performance or display of a work, where such effects are 
caused by a technological protection measure. 
Just one of Shapiro's  recommendations reached the resulting hearings on the 
DMCA on July 22, 1 998 .  The amendment, presented by Representative Cl iff Stearns 
( R-FL), "to provide for a process to define the tenn technological protection 
" . hd b . � '  measure, was wit rawn y unammous consent. · 
The Digital Mi l lennium Copyright Act was si!,1Jled into law October 28 ,  
1 998.R6 In i t s  final forn1, the DMCA fil l s  59 pages and covers five subtitles.l:\7 
Lawmakers seemed to perceive the Internet largely as untamed territory, ripe for 
exploitation by pirates . At the same time, lawmakers acknowledged the need for a 
balanced approach to copyright legi slation . President Bi l l  Cl inton, expressed that 
sentiment when he signed the Act on November 2, 1 998,  saying 
"[ Internet] . . .  technologies . . .  make it possible to pirate copyrighted works on a global 
s s  H. Rept. 1 05-55 1 (part I I ) .  Report of the H ouse Commerce Committee on H . R .  22R 1 ,  The Digita l  
M i l lenni um Copyright Act (Ju ly  22. 1 99S) .  
x 6  Digital M i l lenn ium Copyright Act. Pub. L.No.  1 05-304. 1 1 2 Stat. 2860. 
R7 1 7  U .S .C .  � 20 1 .  the Digital Mil lenni um Copyright Act includes. Title 1. W l PO Treat ies  
I mplementat ion:  Ti t le  1 1 .  Onl i ne Copyright I nfringement L iabi l i ty L imitat ion :  Tit le I l l , Computer 
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scale with a single keystroke. The WlPO treaties set c lear and firm standards . . .  This 
Act implements those standards, carefully balancing the interests of both copyright 
owners and users ."R8 
In researching the DMCA in l ight of the h istorical spirit of copyright l aw,  this 
thesi s  i s  primari ly concerned with two sections of the Act. Title l, Chapter 1 2  
"Copyright Protection and M anagement Systems" i s  the final version of the 
recommendations in the Nil  Working Group ' s  Report, as di scussed above, including 
Section 1 20 1 .  Also of interest, Title I l  "Online Copyright Infringement Liabi l ity 
Limitation," which rel i eves Internet Service Providers ( ISPs) of contributory 
copyright infringement l iabi l ity in certain circumstances that are spel led out in the 
Section. According to John Ashcroft, then a Republ ican Senator from M issouri , 
"Make no mistake about i t ,  c lari fi cation of on-l ine service provider l iabi l i ty was one 
of my fundamental concerns in the debate . . . ,lN 
Perhaps the most criticized Section of the DMCA is 1 20 1 ,  the anti-
circumvention measure?) As discussed in  both the Senate and House hearings, 
Section 1 20 I addresses security devices used on the Internet that restrict access to . 
data, requiring proper procedure to gain access�be it registration, paying a fee, or 
Maintenance or Repair Copyright Exemption: Title I V. M i scell aneous Provisions: and Title V .  
Protection of Certain Original  Designs. 
xx U .S .C.C.A.N . 1 05' 11 2d Scss .. P .L . I OS-304. Statement by President Wi l l i am .1 . Clinton Upon Signing 
I-I . R .22S I .  November 2. 1 99� .  
x� Senator John Ashcroft ( R-MO). Senate floor debate on S .  2037.  the Digital M i l lennium Copyright 
Act ( May 1 4. 1 998) .  
911 Van Den Elzen. Ryan L . .  Decn·pting the DMCA: Fair Use as a De(ense to the Distribution of' 
DeCSS. Notre Dame Law Review. Vol .  77 ,  No. 2 .  page 673 (2002 ) ;  Brannan. Anna Clavcria, Fair Use 
Doctrine and the Digital Millennium Copyright A ct: Does Fair Use Exist under the DMCA 7, Santa 
Clara Law Review. Vol . 42. No. I .  page 247 (2001  ): Fox, Adam R . . The Digital Millennium Copyright 
A ct: Disabusing the Notion ofa Constitutional Moment. R utgers Computer & Technology L . J .  Vol .  27  
(200 1 ) . 
some other requirement. For example, U .S .  software company Adobe Systems 
developed an "E-Book Reader," a device that al lows a user to read an electronic book 
from a computer or handheld device . The software was free, but was required in order 
to read an electronic  book. The software also restricted the uses of an electronic book, 
preventing copying or fi le  sharing. Jn early 200 1 ,  a Russian software company cal l ed 
ElcomSoft developed the Advanced E-Book Processor (AEBPR),  which enabled a 
user to convert electronic book fi les into unprotected PDF fi les. 9 1 That "anti-
circumvention" device was exactly the type of device that the DMCA sought to 
control . 
The law provides protection for copyright owners who put their work online 
and use security software or devices to protect that work from piracy. Section 
1 20 1  (a)( l ) (A) reads "No person shal l  circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this  tit le."92 Even as members of 
Congress debated the "anti-circumvention" measure, the possibi l ities of over-
protecting copyright owners must have weighed heavily on them. How else to explain 
the subsets (B) ,  (C), (D )  and (E) ,  which effectively water down the statement made in 
(A)? Trouble arose when lawmakers considered fair use provisions to copyright 
protection . Section 1 20 1  (B)  reins in the power of (A) .  "The prohibition contained in 
subparagraph (A)  shal l  not apply  to persons who are . . .  adversely  affected by virtue of 
such prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of that . . .  work. ,m 
9 1  United States of A merica, v.  £/com Ltd. and Dmitri' Sklrarov. 203 F .  Supp. 2d I I  I I . 2002, charges 
dropped in January 2003 . 
92 1 7  U .S .C.  § 1 20 1 (a ) ( I ) (A )  
9 3  1 7  U .S .C .  § 1 20 1 (a ) ( I )( B )  
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But lawmakers were concerned with the lasting effect of 1 20 I (a) ( l ) (A) .  Would 
anti-circumvention provi sions severely affect noninfringing uses on the I nternet? For 
Congress, the solution to that problem was vexing enough to pass it on to the 
Librarian of Congress and the Copyright Office. Known as the "fail  safe" provi sion, it 
would be up to the Librarian to determine whether or not the anti-circumvention 
language was too far-reaching.94 What' s  more, the L ibrarian could designate whole 
classes of information as legal ly accessible to anyone for noninfringing purposes 
despite security software protecting that work. The Librarian was charged with 
publ i shing his or her findings regarding the effect of the anti-circumvention provision 
l)'i every three years. -
This thesis also is concerned with another Section of the DMCA. In encouraging 
the development of the Internet, Congress sought to protect onl ine industries from 
l iabi l i ty. Title I I ,  "Online Copyright Infringement Liabil ity Limitation" seeks to 
94 See 1 7  U .S .C.  � 1 20 I (a ) (  I ) (C) :  H . R .  Rep. No. I 05-55 1 ,  pt. 2. at 36 "Given the threat of a d iminution 
of otherwise l awful access to works and information. the Committee on Commerce bel ieves that a 
' fai l-safe ·  mechanism is required. This mechanism woul d  . . .  a l low the . .  [waiver of the anti­
circumvention provi sions] , for l imited time periods, if necessary to prevent a d iminution in the 
avai labi l ity to individual users of a particular category of copyrighted material s." 
9' 1 7  U .S .  C.  � 1 20 I (a)( I )(C) During the 2-year period described i n  subparagraph (A) .  and during each 
succeeding 3-ycar period. the Librarian of Congress. upon the recommendation of the Register of 
Copyrights. who shall consult with the Assi stant Secretary for Communicat ions and I nformation of the 
Department of Commerce and report and comment on his or her views in making such rccommedation, 
shal l  make the determ ination in a rulemaking proceeding on the record for purposes of subparagraph 
( B )  of whether persons who arc users of a copyrighted work are. or arc l i kely to be in the succeeding 3-
year period. adversely affected by the prohibition under subparagraph ( A) in their abi l ity to make 
noninfringing uses under thi s t i t le of a particular class of copyrighted works. In conducting such 
rulcmaki ng. the Librarian shall examine-( i )  the avai labi l i ty for usc of copyrighted works: ( i i )  the 
avail abi l i ty for usc of works for nonprofit archival ,  preservation. and educat ional purposes :  ( i i i )  the 
impact that the prohibit ion on the circumvention of technological measures appl ied to copyrighted 
works has on crit ic ism. comment. news report ing. teachi ng, scholarship. or research: ( i v )  the cfTect of 
circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works :  and (v )  
such other factors as  the Librarian considers appropriate. ( D) The Librarian shal l publ i sh any  class of 
copyrighted works for which the Librarian has determ ined, pursuant to the rulemaking conducted 
under subparagraph (C) ,  that noninfringing uses by persons who arc users of copyrighted work are, or 
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encourage Internet development by providing shelter to online services from l iabi l ity 
suits. 
"The notion that service providers should not bear the responsibil ity for 
copyright infringements when they are solely transmitting the material i s  one key to 
the future growth of the Internet. . . .  If  someone i l legal ly transmits material in the 
Internet, the Internet companies that provide the opportunity for people to transmit 
the material shouldn ' t  be held responsible any more than . . .  Xerox should  be held 
responsible if you violate a copyright by i l legal ly  copying material on the Xerox 
machine."96 
Clearly, Internet development was an ominous enticement in Conf,rress' 
development of the DMCA. "In short, by  l imiting the l iab il ity of service providers, 
the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the Internet wil l  continue to improve and 
that the variety and qual ity of services on the Internet wil l  continue to expand.'m 
By 2003,  after the DMCA had been in effect for five years , how had it 
performed in court? How did it affect the spiri t  of copyright law? 
are l ikely to be. adversely affected. and the prohibit ion contained i n  subparagraph (A) shal l  not apply 
to such users with respect to such class of works for the ensuing 3-year period. 
96 Senator John Ashcroft ( R-MO). Senate floor debate on S .  2037. the Digital M i l lennium Copyright 
A ct ( May 1 4. 1 998) .  
9 7  Senator Orrin H atch ( R-UT). Senate floor debate on S .  2037. the Digital M i l lennium Copyright Act 
( May 1 4, 1 99R) .  
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Chapter IV: L iteratu re Review 
A. Primary Sources. 
This thesi s uses various sources beginning, of course, with the Constitution ' s  
foundation of copyright in  the United States .  "Congress shall have the power to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for l imited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries."9R Some additional sources are l i sted here. 
In addition to the Constitution, thi s thesi s examines one particular amendment 
to U .S .  copyright statutes, the 1 998 Digital Mi l lennium Copyright Act.99 That Act 
addressed copyright in  the age of digital technology, spec i fical ly the Internet. This 
thesis examines two particular sections of the DMCA, Section 1 20 1 , which makes 
circumvention of copyright protection devices i l legal ,  and Section 5 1 2 , which 
provides "safe harbor" for Internet service providers when their users post 
copyrighted information onl ine. 
The legis lative history of the DMCA was also sourced. Those hearings and 
floor debates provided insight into the legislators ' intentions during the bi l l ' s  drafting. 
Furthermore, this  history i l lustrated the various draft changes that resulted in  the 
finished DMCA. 1 00 
9� U.S .  Const i tution. Art ic le I. Section X .  
9 9  The Digital M i l l enn ium Copyright Act of 1 9n.  Pub .  L> No. I 05-304, 1 1 2 Stat . 21\60 ( 1 991\) .  1 0° Floor statements accompanying i ntroduction of S .  1 1 2 1 ,  W I PO Copyright and Perfom1ances and 
Phonograms Treaty I mplementation Act ( Ju ly  29. 1 997) :  Text of H . R .  228 1 ,  WI PO Copyright Treaty 
I mplementation Act, as original ly i ntroduced ( Ju ly  29. 1 997) :  H. Rept. 1 05-55 1 ( Part 1 ). Report of thc 
House J udic iary Committee on Courts and Intel lectual Property ( September 1 6  and 1 7. 1 997) :  S .  Rept. 
1 05 - 1 90, Report of thc Senate J udiciary Committee on S. 2037. the Digital M i l lennium Copyright Act 
( May 6, 1 998) :  Senate floor debate on Senate version of the b i l l .  S .  2037. the Digital M i l lenni um 
4 1  
These DMCA provisions have resulted in several cases where the l aw was 
cal led into question. Some cases cited here came before the DMCA, but the 
circumstances were directly relevant to thi s thesis .  Cases include Religious 
Technolot,'Y Center v. Netcom, in which Denni s Erl ich had posted the copyrighted 
work of L. Ron Hubbard on his own web site. 1 0 1 Rel igious Technology Center owned 
the copyright, and asked Erlich to remove the work. When Erl ich refused, Rel igious 
Technology Center asked Netcom to remove the material�Netcom was the I S P  
providing Erlich with Internet service. Netcom refused because Rel igious Technology 
Center did not provide adequate proof of their copyright ownership.  
Al so, United States ofAmerica, v .  £/com, in which a software company 
devised a system that a l lowed users to copy E-Books from CD to hard drives. 1 02 The 
COs contained electronic versions of books. Users could buy the CD and read the 
document from their computers . However, software devices contained on the CD 
prevented the user from copying the information (and a message on  the system 
claimed that reading the book aloud was also a violation of copyright) .  But the device 
also restricted what users could do with the E-Book once they bought it. After some 
pretrial publicity, charges were dropped. But the case sti l l  rai sed important 
distinctions regarding the DMCA. 
Copyright Act ( May 6 .  1 99X) ;  Hearing on  H .  R .  22R I before the House Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications. Trade. and Consumer Protection (J une 5 .  1 99X) ;  Text of H . R .  22X I .  the Digital 
Mi l lenni um Copyright Act. as reported by House Commerce Committee ( Ju ly  22.  1 998) ;  House floor 
debate on H . R .  22S I .  the Digital M i l lenni um Copyright Act ( A ugust 4. 1 998) ;  House floor debate on 
Conference Report on H . R .  228 1 .  the Digital M i l lennium Copyright Act (October 1 2  and 1 3 . 1 998) .  
1 1 1 1  See supra. note 78 .  
I ll'  - Sec supra. note 9 1 .  
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I n  a pair of cases, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, and Universal 
City Studios v. Corley, the DMCA anti-circumvention provis ion received infamous 
notoriety. Both cases involved a program call ed DeCSS,  which was an anti -
circumvention device used to crack the security software that accompanies DVD 
movies. 1 0:> When movie studios del ivered DVD movies, they used CSS code to 
protect the content from copying. A Norwegian teenager successful ly defused CSS  
with h i s  program DeCSS,  and made the program available on  the I ntenet. Both 
Reimerdes and Corley carried the program on their web sites, and were subsequently 
sued by a host of movie houses. Soon after the enactment of the DMCA, some of its 
provi sions were being scrutinized in the Reimerdes and Corley defenses. Both tria ls  
and their outcomes were significant to the hi story of the DMCA and its development. 
Although it came before the DMCA, Sony v. Universal City Studios, "the 
Betamax Case," was an historical ly important deci sion regarding the anti-
circumvention provision. 1 04 In that trial ,  Universal sued Sony when it manufactured 
the VCR for sale to the public .  Because of the VCR' s  copyright infringement 
capabi lity, Universal c laimed the device would be used to faci l i tate massive and 
costly copyright infringement. The court disagreed, in part because of the non-
infringing uses of a VCR . However, the case is important for di scussion because of 
the circumvention precedent set fourteen years before the enactment of the DMCA. 
1 113 Universal Cit\' Studios. Inc. 1'. Reimerdes. 1 1 1  F .  Supp. 2d. 346 (S .D .N .Y .  2000). and Uni1 ·ersa/ Citv 
Studios, Inc. v. Corler. 273 F3d 429, 60 USPQ2d 1 953 (2d Cir .  200 1 ) . 
1 04 Sony 1 '. Univer.1a/Citv 5'tudios. the "Beta max Case." 464 U.S .  4 1 7. 1 04 S .  Ct .  774 .. 78  L .  Ed. 2d .  
574 ( 1 984) .  
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In A &M Records v. Napster a "peer-to-peer" web site operator l inked end 
users to other end users all over the world. 1 05 End users made l ists of their own digi tal 
music fi les, and made those l ists accessible from the Napster site.  Each user could 
then review those l ists and select songs to download from other users . The fact that 
Napster was a "peer-to-peer" site is significant because the digital songs were never 
physical ly located on Napster' s servers. A&M Records, and a l arge number of music 
industry corporations, sued Napster for copyright infringement, in part under the 
DMCA Section 5 1 2 . The District Court agreed with the music industries and, in  
effect, terminated the Napster web site. The case raised questions about the DMCA 
and fair use, and it served as a precedent for other DMCA trial s .  
For example, in ALS Scan v .  RemarQ, a provider of pornographic images, 
sued an l SP when the lSP refused to take down copyrighted images from a user ' s  
newsgroup. 1 06 ALS Scan, an  adult content business, claimed copyright ownership of 
images found on a newsgroup that was carried by RemarQ, an l SP .  ALS Scan asked 
the ISP to remove the material ,  but the request itself did not meet all the requirements 
outl ined in the DMCA. Because of that, RemarQ refused to comply, and ALS Scan 
sued. The Di strict Court found in favor of ALS Scan, rul ing that rigid compl iance 
with the DMCA requirement for notification was not absolute. E stabli shment of 
precedent may be the most important outcome of this deci sion . 
Just one year after the ALS Scan decision, RemarQ was back in court again; 
this time as part of the defense in Ellison v. Robertson. 107  Again, Section 5 1 2  came 
10� A &M Records, Inc. \'. Napster. Inc. ,  239 F .  3d 1 004 (200 1 ) .  
1 0<' ALS Scan. Inc. 1 ' .  RemarQ Communities. Inc.,  239 F. 3d 6 1 9  (200 1 )  
1 07 Ellison \'. Rohertson, 1 t\9 F. Supp. 2d 1 05 1  (2002) .  
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into question as a writer claimed unauthorized copies of his  material were found on 
several I SPs,  including America Online. But different from the ALS Scan decision, 
this case was resolved in favor of the ISPs, and it raised additional concerns regarding 
specific l anguage within the Section 5 1 2  provisions.  
Final ly, in  Hendrickson v .  eBay, a copyright owner of the movie Manson 
claimed copyright infringement when he found pirated copies of the tape on the I SP 
eBay. 1 0x Like the ALS Scan case, Hendrickson did not fol low proper protocol for 
notifying the ISP of the infringing material . However, in Hendrickson, the District 
Court found that the deviations from protocol were signifi cant. 
The legis lative materia ls  and court decisions di scussed above, along with the 
formative l anguage of Article I ,  Section 8-the copyright and patent provision of the 
Constitution of the United States-were the primary sources used for this  thesi s .  
B. Secondary Sources. 
Perhaps the controversy accompanying the efforts to interpret and apply 
Sections 5 1 2  and 1 20 1  of the DMCA has increased the commentary on the 
legi slation. A steady supply of law review articles was avai lable providing insight, 
opinion, history, crit ic ism and even some praise for the DMCA, its provisions, and 
the resulting case law. Although not exhaustive, this review covers some of most 
helpful  documents in compi l ing this thesis .  
A significant source of information came from Melvi l le N immer's I 0-volume 
work Nimmer on Copyright, which contains  a thorough analysis helpful  for 
1 11�' Hendrickson 1 '. eBen·. 1 65 F .  Supp. 2d 1 082 (200 1 ) . 
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understanding the basic principles of copyright. 1 09 However, particularly helpful  was 
an appended volume of Nimmer aimed specifi ca l ly at the DMCA. The Congressional 
Committee Reports on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Concurrent 
Amendments provided a single source of infonnation that included the "Copyright 
Term Extension Act," the "Digital M i l lennium Copyright Act," the "WIPO Copyright 
Treaties Implementation and On-line Copyright Infringement Liabi l ity Limitation ," a 
"Section-by-Section Analysis of H .R. 228 1 as Passed by the United States House of 
Representatives on August 4, 1 998," and the "W IPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)." 1 1 0 
Two separate texts were particularly notable for summarizing copyright law 
and specifical ly i ssues involving the DMCA. First, Law of" the Internet, by F. 
Lawrence Street and Mark P .  Grant, included a significant overview of Section 5 1 2 , 
the requirements for achieving "safe harbor," and summaries of relevant cases. 1 1 1  The 
book also reviewed Section 1 20 I and summaries for relevant cases, some of which 
were used in this  thesis ,  including A &M Records v. Napster, Intellectual Reserve, 
Inc. , v. Utah L ighthouse Minisfl�v. Inc . ,  and Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes. 1 1 2 
Second. Internet and Computer Law: Cases-Comments-Questions, was also 
a valuable, compiled source for copyright i ssues involving the DMCA. 1 1 3  More 
annotated than Law of the Internet, this text extensively reviewed Universal Ci(v 
1 0'! N immer. Melvi l le  B . . Nimmer on Copyright. Lexis Nexis  (2002) .  
1 1 0 N immer. Melvi l le  B .. and David N immer. Nimmer on Copyright: Congressional Committee 
Ri'ports on thi' Digital A1illennium Copyright Act and Concurrent A nwndnJi'nts. M atthew Bender & 
Co .. San Francisco (2000). 
1 1 1  Street. F.  Lawrence. and Mark P .  Grant, Lm;· ofthe Internet: 2001 Edition. Lex is  Publ i shing ( 2000) .  
1 1 = A & M  Records. Inc. 1·. Napster. lnc . .  239 F.  3 d  1 004 (200 l ) . lntellectual Reserve. Inc. l'. Utah 
Lighthouse Mini.1trr. Inc. 75 F. Supp. 2d. 1 290 ( 1 999). and see supra note 1 03 .  
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Studios v. Reimerdes, and other cases involving anti -circumvention . Internet and 
Computer Law also provided an extensive overview of fair use, and first sale .  In 
addition, this text provided legislative descriptions and analysis of concepts l ike 
"contributory infringement," "direct infringement,'' and "vicarious infringement." 
Similarly, the Law ofMass Communications, by Dwight Teeter and Bi l l  
Loving, provided a helpful  overview of fair use, and cases involving that statute. 1 1 4 
Specifical ly, that text provided a useful  summary of Rosemont Enterprises v. Random 
House, Inc . ,  a case that emphasized a public interest in the concept of "fair use." In  
addition, Law oj'Mass Communications provided a summary of copyright history, 
beginning with copyright ' s  exi stence before U .S .  law, and leading up to the U .S .  
Constitution. 
Two texts were especial ly helpful in conducting historical research, Leon 
Seltzer 's  Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright provided a detai led account of 
historical events in U .S .  copyright hi story. 1 1 5 Catherine Sevi l le ' s  Litermy Copyright 
Re.f(mn in Early Victorian England described England' s  influence on the foundation 
ofU.S .  copyright law, and a well -written review of world copyright hi story. 1 1 6 
I n  addition to these texts, numerous journal articles provided review and 
comment on DMCA legi slation and tria l  decisions. Adam Fox ' s  work The Digital 
Millennium Copyright A ct:  Disabusing the Notion ofa Constitutional Moment helped 
put into perspective some of the countervai l ing opinions regarding certain DMCA 
1 1 3 Maggs. Peter B . ,  John T.  Soma, and James A .  Sprowl, Internet and Computer Law: Cases� 
Comments--Questions, American Casebook Series West Group, St. Paul , Minn .  ( 200 1 ) .  
1 1 4 Teeter. Dwight L . .  and B i l l  Loving. Law o(Mass Communications: Frf.'edom and Control o(Print 
and Broadcast Media, Tenth Edition, Foundation Press, New York (200 1 ) . 
1 1 5 See supra. note 24. 
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provisions. 1 1 7 Of a simi lar opinion, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, in her article A drift 
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, proposed that the DMCA 
statute exhibited a "sense of humor" because of its "sly and unkind wit" regarding the 
special needs of nonprofit, educational ,  and research users. 1 1 8 
Final ly, Alfred Yen, a Boston College law professor, described potential 
Section 5 1 2  shortcomings in his article Internet Service Provider Liabi/ityfiJr 
Subscriber Copyright lnfi·ingement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment. 1 1 9  
Yen has written several articles regarding copyright and the Internet , and his  
comments were helpful  in developing this thesis .  While these materia ls  provided 
essentia l  sources, a host of additional sources a lso contributed indirectly to this thesis .  
For example, consider thi s :  
"YOU ARE COMMANDED to  produce and permit inspection and copying of 
the fol lowing documents or objects at the place, date, and time specified below," read 
a letter from Wal-Mart delivered to "FatWallet.com" on November 27 ,  2002. 
"FatWall et" was a site designed to provide a forum for discussing products and prices 
of consumer goods, and had posted one ofWal-Mart ' s  Thanksgiving sale flyers on its 
web pages. In a legal procedure invoking the DMCA's  l imited l iabi l i ty provisions, 
Wal-Mart sought protection under Section 5 1 2( c ) ( 1 ) ,  which cal ls for a notice of 
infringement to be sent to the ISP-in this case, FatWal let. Under the DMCA Section 
5 1 2(h), the copyright owner can request from "the clerk of any United States district 
1 1 6 See supra. note 22 .  
1 1 7  Fox, Adam R., The Digital A1i//ennium Copyright A ct: Disabusing the Notion of a Constitutional 
Moment. Rutgers Computer & Technology L.J . Vol . 27 ( 200 1 ) . 
I I R S' J O  ee supra, note .
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court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an al leged 
infringer. . .  " 1 20 Wal-Mart need not attain a court order, but show only a copy of the 
notice sent to Fat Wallet ,  a proposed subpoena, and a sworn statement that the 
material is copyrighted. 1 2 1 As yet, no suit has been filed. 
"Wal-Mart ' s  action invoked a part of the DMCA that al lows a copyright 
holder to ask for ' identification of an al leged infringer' without fi l ing a lawsuit 
first,
-- 1 22 said Deirdre Mul l igan, a privacy expert at the University of California at 
Berkeley 's  Boalt Hal l  Law School . "People are using the DMCA as an extremely 
flexible tool that gets ISPs to take down information. ISPs are not in a position to 
fight back. It requires resources-it puts them in a position where they could assume 
liabil ity. The abi lity to si lence speakers even where the underlying claim does not 
have any merit is worrying." 
"If they do not become more carefu l ,  the courts may degrade the DMCA into 
a 'one free pass' rule :  An ISP would be immune from l iabi l i ty so long as i t  remained 
in a state of blissful  ignorance, but once it received the first notice of infringing 
activity, it  would be on notice concerning the possibil ity of future infringements," 
said Jonathan Band and Matthew Schruers, "This  would mean that I SPs would have 
to choose between either exposing themselves to infringement l iabi l ity or incurring 
1 1 9 Yen. Alfred C. ,  Internet Service Prm·ider Liahi!irvfor Subscriber Copvright lnfi·ingemenl, 
E111erprise Liahilit\', and the First A mendment. RR Georgetown Law Journal 1 833 .  pg. 1 R?R (2000) .  1 20 1 7  U .S.C.  � 5 1 2(h) . Sec also, Yen note at 1 9 1 .  1 2 1  Wa/Marl Obtains DMCA Subpoena to Obtain /denti(\' o(Pos/er ofAdvertised Price Data, Tech 
Law Journal ( December 4 ,  2002) [ www .techlawjournal .com/alert/2002/ 1 2/04.asp, l ast visited April 9. 
2003] (emphasis added) .  1 22 Ebert, Lawrence, B . . It 's Bound to Scare You. Boy. I ntel lectual Property Today, Features. pg. 46 
(March 2003) .  
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significant monitoring costs. E i ther al ternative wil l  impede the growth of the 
Internet." 1 23 
Similarly, the DMCA "s  anti-circumvention has been the subject of creative 
lawsuits. A magazine article released at the time of the writing of thi s thesis cal led 
attention to a case that brought a new twist of interpretation to the DMCA' s  anti-
circumvention provision. 1 24 A manuf<1cturer of computer laser printers, Lexmark 
International ,  added a computer chip to its printers so that only  Lexmark brand toner 
cartridges were recognized by the printer system. If another brand of toner cartridge 
were used, the Lexmark printer would not function. Wishing not to lose a share of the 
toner cartridge market, Static Control Components company developed a replacement 
chip that al lowed the Lexmark printer to operate with any brand of toner cartridge. 
Lexmark sued Static Control Components for copyright infringement, in part, under 
the DMCA anti-circumvention provision. In the suit, Lexmark claimed that Static 
Control ' s  chip circumvented a security device that protected Lexmark ' s  copyrighted 
software within the printer itself. On Februay 27 ,  2003,  a di strict court agreed, issuing 
a prel iminary injunction on behalf of Lexmark. 1 25 
"A question for the courts wi l l  be whether the DMCA was intended to apply 
in these circumstances." said Steve Seidenberg, attorney and freelance writer. "But 
what Congress intended, and what the law says, may be two separate things ." 
1 2" Band. Jonathan. and Matthew Schruers. Sale Harhors Against the Liahili(v Hurricane: The 
Communications Dt'ct'ncr A ct and the Digital Millt'nnium Copyright A ct. Cardozo A rts & 
Entertainment Law Journal. Vol . 20. No. 2 (2002) .  
1 24 Ebert, Lawrence. B . . It 's Bound to Scart' You, Boy, I ntel lectual Property Today, Features, pg. 46 
( March 2003 ) .  
1 2 � Lexmark International Inc. . \ '. Static Control Components, Inc .. Civi l  Action No .  02-57 1 -KSF.  E .D .  
Kent. (2003 ) .  
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Seidenber cited one attorney who said '" [The Lexmark case] i s  far, far beyond what 
Congress intended, but if I look at recent cases interpreting the DMCA, I think, 
unfortunately, Lexmark has a good case. "' 1 26 The Lexmark outcome will be worth 
watching. 
Beginning with its enactment about 4 V2 years ago, the DMCA has spawned a 
plentifu l  supply of l iterature. In  evaluation of the Act, some of those journal articles 
are critical of the Act ' s  effect on the First Amendment. This l iterature review outlines 
some of those articles, and highlights specific suggestions for improving the DMCA 
in an effort to better balance copyright protection. 
For example, Martin Hal stead, in a Tulsa Lmv Review article, suggested the 
DMCA was a serious blow the principle of fair use. "In the period between the 
Copyright Act of 1 976 and the DMCA, fair use was a codified j udicial doctrine under 
which use would be judged fair or unfair on the basis of statutory guidelines," he said. 
"The DMCA effectively swept away the greater part of [that] doctrine whi le stating 
an express intent not to do so." 1 27 
Consider an American who buys a DVD loaded with research material, 
Hal stead suggests .  The DVD was available only from France. Upon receiving the 
DVD, the American discovers it wil l  not play in his player because it is "regional ly  
1 c6 Seidenberg. Steve. Suits Test Limits o/DMCA . Connecti cut Law Tribune. Vol .  3 .  No . 5 .  pg. 1 0. 
March 5 .  2003 . Seidenberg explained "This  i sn ' t  the first t ime that manufacturers have tried to usc 
copyright law to prevent third-party add-ons. For instance. Sega. the manufacturer of a popular game 
console, sued the maker of some third-party games for copyright infringement. because the gamcmakcr 
embedded some of Sega ' s  copyrighted software i nto i ts  own products so the games could run on 
Sega 's  machines. The courts held that copying software code in  order to create interoperabi l ity is fai r  
use. So  the third-party manufacturer won the case." 
1 :-7 Halstead. M arti n  F., The Regulated Become the Regulators: Prohlems and Pit/(J/Is in the New 
World o/Digital Copwight Legislation. Tulsa Law Review. Vol . 311 .  No. I .  pg. 1 95 ( Fa l l 2002) .  
5 1  
formatted" for play only  in western Europe. A friend shows the American how to 
disable that formatting so the DVD will play on his player. Although the French 
company sel l ing the DVD has received payment from the American for one copy of 
the DVD, both American men are gui l ty of violating the DMCA because they 
di sabled a device that protects copyrighted infonnation. 
In offering a potential solution to the DMCA's  balance problem, H al stead first 
suggested tolerance from the copyright owners, appearing to agree in concept with 
Variety.com editor, Travis  Smith who claimed the Internet and digi tal revolution are 
not damaging to copyright owners, but simply change the business model . 1 28 "The 
copyright system," Halstead said, "can and perhaps should survive a certain amount 
of home copying as part of the price of the acknowledged benefits that fal l  to 
copyright holders from technology." 1 29 In appl ying the DMCA legislation to the 
music recording industry, Halstead suggested the recording industry "should focus its 
efforts on unauthorized distrihution of copyrighted works as the true threat to the 
commercial balance between users and producers ." 1 30 In other words, it  is the 
di stribution of the material that violates copyright protection, and not the access to, or 
the downloading of materia l .  
Tonia Pever agreed. In her Capital University Law Review article, Pever 
recommended amending the DMCA to specify that copyright infringement is found 
I .:' X  Sec infi·a, note 22 1 .  I '"'ll) , 
· See supra, note 1 27 .  
uo See supra, note 1 27 (emphas is  added) .  
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only when the infringer i s  using the material for "commercial use." 1 3 1 Citing Jessica 
Litman, a professor of J aw at Wayne State University, Pever argued that it should be 
only "commercial use"-the user intending to profit from the owner' s  work-that 
constitutes copyright infringement. Digital reproduction is too pervasive to control,  
and simple copying of material should not, in and of itself, be considered copyright 
infringement . 1 32 
Final ly, Hal stead suggested, the DMCA may circumvent the "First Sale" 
doctrine . "Presently, a buyer may resel l  a work (such as a used book or CD) to a third 
party without payment of a royalty on the second sale . However, many of the copy 
protection schemes currently being introduced prevent copying by 'tying' use of a 
recording or e-book to a specific user or a specific computer. The purchaser cannot 
sell the recording to another when he is finished with it, as the recording or book 
functions only on the specific  computer or hard drive to which it is 'tied. ' "  m 
Perhaps the simplest advice for improving the DMCA came from Tricia J .  
Sadd, who at the time of her publication was a Juri s Doctor Candidate a t  George 
Mason University School of Law. Sadd suggested the DMCA ' s  shortcomings in 
regard to fair use could be eliminated with an alternative reading of the exi sting 
DMCA Section 1 20 1 . "[T]he 'fai l -safe ' mechanism of section 1 20 l (a)  can be seen as  
undergirding, rather than replacing, fair use. Such a reading avoids the total rejection 
1 3 1  Pcvcr. Tonia ,  The Transf'er of'Media to Digital Form: Redefining the Copyright lnfi·ingement Test 
to Include Commercial Use as a Digital Coprright lnfi·ingenwnt. Capital Un i versity Law Review. Vol . 
3 1 .  No. 1 .  pg. 1 09 ( 2003) .  
u :  !hid. Sec also Jessica Litman, Re1•ising Copyright Lawfor the lnj(mnation Age. The I nternet and 
Telecommunications Pol icy: Selected Papers from the 1 995 Telecommunications Pol icy Research 
Conference 2 72 (Gera ld  W. Brock & Gregory L. Rosston cds. 1 996 ) .  
1 33 See supra. note 1 27 .  
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of fair use as a defense under the OM CA. By opening up the possibi l ity of 
distributing circumvention devices for fair use, the DMCA can be seen to 
acknowledge the new right of access given to copyright holders as well as a corol lary 
right of access for fair uses. Such an interpretation avoids the possibi l i ty that one 
could have a right to access, but not a right to a means of access ." 1 34 Referring to the 
subsections of 1 20 I ,  Sadd suggested that, for example, 1 20 I (b) could include fair use 
as a legitimate means for accessing copyrighted work. "The prohibition contained in 
subparagraph (A) shal l not apply to persons who are . . .  adversely affected by virtue of 
such prohibition in their abi l ity to make noninfringing uses of that . . .  work ." m 
In applying this need for alternative interpretation to Section 5 1 2  of the 
DMCA, Band and Schruers are in agreement. "[U]nless the courts begin applying the 
DMCA in accordance with its plain language and its clear legislative hi story, 
Congress may have to dredge out the DMCA's  safe harbors so as to restore them to 
their intended effectiveness." 1 36 However, under scrutiny of U .S .  courts ,  neither of 
these interpretations has yet to surface. 
Research also uncovered some solutions that were vague and without actual 
suggestions for a change in the DMC A ' s  language. For example, one critic suggested 
that the problem requires a clearer interpretation of infringement defined by the 
entertainment industry and the scientific  industry. "The most immediate solution 
would involve an al l iance and discourse between the entertainment industry and the 
scientific community," she said, "encouraging the promotion of.scientific research 
1 34 Sadd, Tricia J . ,  Fair Use as a Defense under the Digital Millennium Coprright Act 's Anti­
Circl/111\'ention Pro1 ·isions. George Mason Law Review. Vol . 1 0. No.  2 ,  pg. 3 2 1  (Winter 200 1 ) . 
1 3 ' /hid. 
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and exchange of ideas, while jointly working towards the eradication of digi tal p iracy. 
Such efforts could involve a study of the First Amendment concerns, and how the 
R IAA, long an advocate of free speech, could be i nvolved in efforts to protect i ts 
interests, while safeguarding the rights of others to freely publ i sh their 
communications .  Such analysis of current standards may reveal that the DMCA must 
be more specific in  scope on what type of research leads to infringement. . . .  An 
industry consensus must be reached expl icit ly adopting its position on scientific 
research and what i t  considers to be impermissible copyright infringment under the 
DMCA." 1 3 7 
Other articles turned up general di scussions regarding the DMCA and 
Sections 1 20 1  and 5 1 2 . A recent article by Joseph Chovanes examined the findings in 
the recent Elcom case. 1 38 Chovanes looked at the plaint iffs  arguments, and recounted 
the courts '  responses to those arguments. especial ly highlighting the chal lenges to the 
Constitution. 1 39 
Plaintiffs in  Elcom argued that the DMCA was impermissibly vague, and 
"thus violated the due process guarantees of the F ifth Amendment." 1 40 The First 
Amendment i ssues rai sed in both cases were predicated on the defendant ' s  arguments 
that the DMCA "violated a number of First Amendment protections, by both 
attempting to ban protected speech [the defendant ' s  computer program] and 
1 36 See supra. note 1 23 .  
1 37 Harper. Tieffa. Much A do Ahout The First Amendment-Does the Digital Mif!ennium Copvright Act 
Impede The Right To Sc ientific Expression?:  Felten \'. Recording lndustl�\' Association o(America, 
Journal of Art and Entertainment Law. Vol .  1 2 . No. I ,  pg. 3 ( Spring 2002) .  
us See a !so note 23  I . 
1 39 Chovanes. Joseph. News. National Law Journal ,  Vol . 25 . No. 6R. pg C3 (January 20. 2003) .  
1 40 !hid. 
55  
attempting to ban protected third-party rights [the right of access to public-domain 
information and the right to fair  use] ." £/com plaintiffs argued that the prohibited 
conduct was too vague to be understood . "Congress had not intended to ban all tools 
providing for copying because such a ban would i nclude tools that provided for legal 
' fair use' copying. Therefore, since the act banned only  those tools that fac i l i tated the 
production of infringing copies, the nature of those tool s  and their ban could simply 
not be understood." 1 4 1 
The court was unmoved. "The statute does not distinguish between devices 
based on the uses to which the device will be put. Instead, al l  tools that enable  
circumvention of  use restrict ions are banned, not merely those use restrictions that 
prohibit infringement . "  1 42 
In Copyright in Cyherspace: Taking a Standfor Lihraries and Lihrwy Users, 
Gretchen Hoffman said "Whi le Section 1 20 I (c)  of the Copyright Act states that 
nothing in the DMCA shall affect fair use, and Section 1 20 1  (d) allows certain 
nonprofit libraries to ' gain access ' to a protected work for purposes of evaluating the 
work for possible acquisition, Section I 2 0 1  (a)  prohibits importation of equipment 
that a l lows circumvention of technologies prevent ing access to a copyrighted work. In  
other words, parts of the DMCA try to placate l ibrarians by saying that fair use wi l l  
not be affected by the act , but  i t  goes on to prohibit the very technology that may be 
necessary to engage in  uses that are indeed fair." 1 4l Hoffman urges fel low l ibrarians 
to "be assert ive" and to not be complacent in regard to legislation that may reduce fair  
1 4 1  !hid. 
1 4 c  Ibid. 
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use. " [ I ]f  l ibrarians are conservative and l imit  themselves to the minimal uses put 
forth in guidel ines, they are giving up the fight and l imiting fair  use forever to those 
standards." 1 44 
In a s imi lar subject to the development of anti-circumvention technology, the 
DMCA also seeks to prevent the act of trafficking in anti-circumvention technology, 
and that subject was wel l covered in Universal City Studios v. Corley. 1 45 In that case, 
a web site operator was sued, in part, for placing hyperl inks on his web site that led 
users to an anti-circumvention technology called DeCSS. 1 46 Corley focused heavi ly  
upon not just the DeCSS program that was posted at the 2600, Inc .  web site, but a lso 
the l inks posted on that site that led to other s ites that posted the DeCSS program. 
After the hearing, the court banned Corley from posting DeCSS on h is  s ite, and a lso 
from "knowingly l inking via a hyperlink to any other web site containing DeCSS." 1 47 
The court rel ied upon the DMCA anti-trafficking provi sion, which states : "No 
person shal l  manufacture, import, offer to the public,  provide, or otherwise traffic in 
h I d . d . h f " 1 4X any tee no ogy, pro uct. service, ev1ce, component, or part t ereo . 
"The Reimerdes-Cor!ey decisions  1 49 indicate that it i s  no longer sufficient to 
convince the courts of the existence of a constitutional requirement of fair  use, since 
the DMCA preserves many conventional forms of such fair  use ( i .e .  pointing a 
camcorder at a monitor di splaying DVD movies encrypted with CSS) .  Rather, future 
143 Hoffman. Gretchen McCord. Copyrighr in CJ·henpacl!: Quesrions and Answers fiJr Librarians. 
N cai-Schuman Publ i shers, I nc  .. New York. pg. 1 47 (200 1 ) . 
1 44 Ib id .  pg. 1 49. 
1 4' See supra. note 1 03 .  
1 46 See infi·a, note at 1 80 for ful l  di scussion on DeCSS. 
1 47 Si!e s�pra. note I 03 . 
1 4x 1 7  U .S .C.  � 1 20 1 (a ) (2 )  and 1 20 1 (b)( 1 ) . 
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l i t igants must convince the courts that a constitutional requirement of fair use exi sts, 
and that its contour is  such that i t  inval idates any measure which prohibits the most 
prevalent, efficient, or superior form of fair use ( i .e .  one that displaces copy machines 
in  favor of scribing monks) .  The Corley decision indicates , however, that unless and 
unti l  the Supreme Court ' ratifies ' its previous ' i solated statements ' to recognize a 
sweeping constitutional right of fair  use approaching the absolute, this batt le i s  going 
to be uphi l l . " 1 50 
In  a s imilar challenge, a Utah court determined in Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. 
Utah Lighthouse Minisfly, Inc. 151 that the defendants had l ikely "engaged in 
contributory copyright infringement when they posted the addresses of three web 
sites that they knew, or should have known, contained pirated copies of the Mormon 
Church ' s Handbook of lnstructions." 1 5 2  According to case law, contributory 
infringement has occurred when "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, 
induces, causes or materia l ly contributes to the infringing conduct of another." 1 53 
Under the Intellectual Reserve case, the court considered the fol lowing 
questions to determine contributory infringement : 
1 .  Can the defendants be l iable under a theory of contributory infringement 
for the actions of those who posted the handbook on the three web sites? 
1 49 S'ee infi·a. note 1 go. 
l )l l  Mihet. Harry. Uni1 ·ersa/ Citr Studios, Inc. v. Corle1·: The Constitutional Underpinnings of Fair Use 
Remain an Open Question, Duke Law and Technology Review ( February 1 4. 2002). 
[www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltriarticles/2002dltr0003.html,  l ast vi sited Apri l 9, 2003] .  
1 ' 1  Intellectual Rese1Te, Inc. 1 '. Utah Lighthouse MinisfiT, Inc. 75 F. Supp. 2d, 1 290 ( 1 999) .  
1 '2 Pope. Cameron. Missing Link(s): Protecting Public Image And Corporate Profits In Cvherspace, 
Houston Law Review. Vol .  3g ,  No. 65 1 (200 1 ) . 
1 ' 3 Gershwin Publishing Corporation \'. Co!umhia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1 1 59, 1 1 62 ( 2d 
Cir. 1 97 1  ) .  
The defendants admitted that the three web sites did in fact infringe on Utah 
Lighthouse M inistry copyright. However, the court also found that the defendants did 
not directly contribute to the infringement because they did not provide the 
copyrighted materia l  in  the first place, nor were they receiving any kind of 
compensation from the three sites. 
2 .  Can the defendants be  l iable under a theory of  contributory infringement 
for the actions of those who browse the three infringing Web sites? 
The defendants made two arguments c laiming that people who browse the 
three web sites are not actual ly  infringing on Utah Lighthouse Ministry ' s  copyrights.  
Looking at those two claims one at a time, first the defendants claimed the people 
browsing the three sites are merely looking at  the Handbook of Instructions and not 
1 1  
. . 1 �4 actua y copymg It .  -
To thi s  argument the court disagreed. In  fol lowing the MAl s:vstems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer. Inc. deci sion, the court found that when viewing material onl ine, the 
computer loads the screen information into random access memory ( RA M ), an 
automatic ,  temporary storage system that computers must use to display information. 
Once that copy i s  made in RAM, copyright has been infringed. 1 5 5  
Under existing Copyright law, the courts and the Nil  have agreed that 
copyright infringement does take place when a copy is  created in the computer 's  
RAM. Therefore, the act of viewing onl ine content is  enough to contribute to 
copyright infringement. However, the courts a lso have held that l iabi lity for copyright 
1 )4 See supra. note 1 5 1 .  
I ) ' .MAl Srsrems Corp. 1 '. Peak Compurer. Inc . . 9 9 1  F .  2d  5 1 1 (9'h C ir. 1 993) .  
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infringement i s  with the persons who caused the display or distribution of the 
infringing materia l  onto their computer. 1 5 c' 
Second, the defendants claimed they did not material ly contribute to the 
infringing conduct. To this, the court also disagreed. "After being ordered to remove 
the Handbook of Instructions from their web site, defendants posted : 'Church 
Handbook of Instructions i s  back online ! '  and l i sted the three web site addresses." 1 5 7  
Furthermore, the defendants were caught through email conversations providing 
downloading encouragement and advice to their users . 
1 56 Marohie-FI. , Inc. 1 '. National Association o(Fire Equipment Distributors. 983 F. Supp. 1 1 67 .  1 1 79 
( N . D. I l l .  1 997) .  
1 57 Sec Supra note 1 5 1 .  
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Chapter V: The DMCA i n  Acti o n :  Copyright Bala nce as 
Interpreted by US Courts 
As covered in  the previous pages of this thesis,  two sections of the DMCA are 
of particular interest in evaluating the spirit of copyright Jaw and its current rendition 
in  the latest amendment to Title 1 7  of the U . S .  Code; Section 1 20 1 ,  Circumvention (�l 
copyright protection :-,ystems, and Section 5 1 2 , Limitations on liahili(v relating to 
material online. During the first four-plus years after the DMCA was enacted in 
1 998, how have courts started to interpret its language? 
A. Title I § 1 201 . Circumvention of copyright protection systems 
Perhaps because of the DMCA ' s  relative youth, there are relatively few 
decisions based upon Section 1 20 1 . However, some key concerns already have come 
to the surface. Of primary interest is the balance of copyright power expressed so 
often throughout U . S .  copyright 's  existence and often referred to by the framers of 
the 1 998 amendment to the Copyright Act. 
In  drafting the DMCA, legislators expressed their desire to maintain fair  use 
and "provisions for l ibrary browsing, special needs of individual creators regarding 
copyright management inforn1ation, provisions exempting nonprofit archives, 
nonprofit educational inst i tutions, and nonprofit l ibraries from criminal penalties and, 
in  the case of civi l  penalties, remitting damages entirely when such institution was not 
aware . . .  that its acts consti tuted a violation." 1 5R Echoing those sent iments in a House 
floor debate days before the DMCA bill passage, Representative Rick Boucher (0-
6 1  
VA) said " . . .  these [DMCA] provisions demonstrate that the legislation i s  not 
intended to diminish core fair use and other rights that have always been recognized 
. . h I , 1 59 m our copyng t aw. 
So just what is circumvention'? According to the DMCA, Section 
1 20 l (b)( l )(A), "to 'c ircumvent a protection afforded by a technological measure '  
means avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or  otherw ise impairing a 
technological measure." 1 w I n  h is  June, 1 998 testimony, Gary Shapiro also addressed 
the language in 1 20 l (b)( I ) (A) ,  "it would make designers of new devices, such as 
computers and VCRs, as wel l as high definition television sets and set top boxes, 
responsible for responding to and implementing any and all technical anti-copy 
measures chosen by anyone who transmits a s ignal or di stributes a program." 1 6 1 
Spoken l ike an electronics  industry spokesperson, Shapiro translates the DMCA word 
"avoiding" to mean devices must be designed to "respond" to security measures. I n  
other words, suppose HBO protects its movie service with a new scrambling 
technology. Simultaneously, RCA develops a new 36-inch digital televi sion set. 
When the RCA set is  attached to a cable service, the television unscrambles the HBO 
s ignal . In the DMCA language, the RCA set i s  "avoiding" a technological measure 
and could no longer be bui l t .  Congress c learly did not seek this type of confusion. 
"Nothing could cause greater disaster and a swifter downfall of our vibrant 
technology sector than to have the federal government dictating the design of 
I 'X Senator Orrin H atch ( R -UT) .  Senate floor debate on Senate version of the b i l l ,  S. 2037 .  the Digital 
M i l lenni um Copyright Act ( May 1 4. 1 99�) .  
1 '9 Representati ve R ick Boucher ( D-VA) .  House floor debate on Conference Report on H . R . 22S 1 .  the 
Digital M i l lenni um Copyright Act (October 1 2 . 1 998) .  
1 611 1 7  U .S.C. � 1 20 1  (b)(  1 ) (A) .  emphasis added. 
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computer chips or mother boards,'' said Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO), during a 
senate floor debate on S .  2037 ,  the Digi tal Mi l lennium Copyright Act. Now that the 
DMCA is law, the question becomes one of interpretation. 
Unfortunately, the letter of the law often fai l s  to retain the intri cacies of good 
intentions .  With the threat of being locked out of browsing online material protected 
by security devices, l ibraries, academicians and researchers cried fou l . 1 62 Section 
1 20 1  says simply, "No person shal l  circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a work protected under this t it le ." 1 (J3 This seemed to 
Jock fair users out of access to protected material . A subsequent section, however, 
followed up with a potential l ife-line for fair  use. "Nothing in this section shall affect 
rights, remedies, l imitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, 
under thi s  tit le." 1 64 But just as Gary Shapiro predicted back in  June, 1 998, a court in 
Universal Studios v. Corley three years after enactment of the DMCA found that 
Section 1 20 1  outlawed circumvention of copyrighted material ,  regardless of whether 
or not the material accessed would be put to "fair use." 1 CJ'i 
In its decision, the court explained that subsection I 2 0 1  (c)( I )  "clarifies that 
the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted materia l ,  
but does not concern itself with the use of those materia ls  after circumvention has 
occurred." The court c ited the DMCA 's legislative hi story regarding the "fai l  safe" 
provi sion, which "authoriz[es] the Librarian of Congress to exempt certain  users from 
1 6 1 See supra note 8 1 .  emphasi s added . 
1 62 See supra note 59, "Some assert that copyright protection should be reduced in the N i l  
environ ment. The publ ic wants information to b e  free and unencumbered on the N I I .  . .  " page 1 4 . 
1 <'3 1 7  LJ .S .C.  § 1 20 1 (a)( l ) (A ) .  
1 64 1 7  LJ .S.C. § 1 20 1 (c) ( l ) . 
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the anti-circumvention provision when it becomes evident that in  practice, the statute 
is adversely affecting certain kinds of fair  use." 1 66 
A potential problem, of course, arises because the Librarian of Congress i s  
unable to peruse and ascertain the exemption potential o f  innumerable  resources on 
the World Wide Web. One wonders if the recommendations of the president and CEO 
of the Consumer E lectronics Association, G ary Shapiro, would have improved the 
situation. " [The anti-circumvention] legis lation, threatens to obl iterate the right of 
l ibraries to serve their patrons and of others to make use of exceptions and l imitations 
in the Copyright Act," he said .  To repair the problem , he proposed a two-part 
amendment to Section 1 20 1  . First, he recommended c larifi cation that 1 20 1  (a)(  1 )  
prohibit circumvention only "for purposes of faci l i tating or engaging in  an act of 
infringement." Second, he recommended replacing 1 20 l (d) with "Al l  rights, 
l imitations and defenses avai lable under this tit le, including fa ir use, shall  be 
appl icable to actions ari sing under thi s Chapter." This change would have required 
flexibil ity from the copyright industries because piracy would possibly become an 
easier crime to commit .  But would Shapiro ' s  recommendations better achieve 
copyright balance? Unil'ersal City Studios v. Corley (2nd Cir. ,  200 I )  suggests not. 
Universal City Studios v. Corley is a case closely tied to Universal Ci(v 
Studios v. Reimerdes, decided one year earl i er. 1 67 After successfu l ly  entering the 
digital age, movie studios were eager to embrace this new technology. However, j ust 
as the introduction of the VCR brought fear of piracy, so digital technology caused 
1 1'' Unh·ersal Ci(r Studios, Inc. 1 '. Corley. 273 F3d 429, 60 U SPQ2d 1 953 (2d Cir .  200 1 ) .  
1 66 Ibid, at Discussion. and court footnote 1 3 . 
1 1'7 Unh·ersal Citr Studios. Inc. \ '. Reimerdes. 1 1 1  F .  Supp. 2d. 346 (S .D .N .Y .  2000). 
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concern for mass unauthorized distribution of copyrighted work. 1 ('� Reimerdes 
involved copyright owners (Universa l )  attempting to prevent unapproved copying of 
digital-versatile-disk ( DVD) movies. A DVD is a computer diskette (s imil ar in looks 
to an audio compact disc) that holds information digital ly.  Like a VHS tape, a DVD i s  
most often used to  hold ful l-length feature movies, and i t  i s  the latest technological 
advancement for consumer home-movie entertainment-a technology that wi l l  surely 
displace the traditional VCR player. 
For Universa l ,  thi s  was not new legal territory. Just sixteen years earl ier in  
1 984, Universal Ci ty had faced off with Sony Corporation in  a s imi lar case involving 
videocassette tapes. 1 69 In that case, Universal argued the VCRs were being used to 
make i l legal copies of copyrighted television programs .  By l i nking a VCR machine to 
a television set, a television program could be taped onto a blank VHS (or Betamax) 
tape. Sony was eventual ly found innocent of contributory copyright infringement 
because the court considered other possible uses provided by a VCR, primari ly  taping 
a television program from a "free" channel such as publ i c  television. 1 70 Because these 
"non-infringing" uses were legitimate under the law, the court did not force Sony to 
cease manufacturing VCRs . .  
After the Sony case, Universal Ci ty Studios learned that the home video 
market became a booming business. I n stead of fighting home video technology 
manufacturing, Universal City and other entertainment companies later joined forces 
with these manufacturers to help develop the DVD player. Important to the motion 
1 6x Sony 1 '. Universal Citv Studios. the "Beta max Case." 464 U .S .  4 1 7. I 04 S. Ct. 774, 78 L .  Ed. 2d .  
574 ( 1 9R4) .  
!6'!  !hid. 
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picture industry was incorporating technology into the DVD players that would 
circumvent i l legal copying of the movies. As a result, the manufacturers developed a 
"content scramble system" (CSS)  that consisted of an encryption technology that 
scrambled the contents of a DVD. In order for the content to play back on a DVD 
player, the player needed the proper technology to descramble the CSS .  Therefore, 
copyright circumvention technology was in place and DVD players manufactured 
without CSS technology would not play a majority of feature motion picture 
DVDs. 1 7 1 
Not long after, individual computer software developers began working on 
ways to circumvent this CSS technology. Eventual ly, a Norwegian teenager was able 
to develop a software program that successfu l ly  decrypted CSS . 1 72 He named this 
program DeCSS and immediately made i t  avai lable on the Internet. DeCSS was an 
anti-circumvention device that unscrambled the CSS protection and made the content 
(the movie itself) avai lable for playing on non-CSS-compatible players, and it 
al lowed for copying the entire movie onto a computer hard dri ve . Of course, once the 
movie is loaded onto a hard drive, i t  can then be copied to any number of b lank 
DVDs. 
In the Reimerdes case, Universal batt led against this new DeCSS technology. 
Unl ike the Sony case, where VCR copies suffered from poor quality with each 
1 71 1  /hid. 
1 7 1  Sec llni1 •ersal Citr Studios, Inc. et a!. 1 '. Sha11·n C Reimerdes, et a! . . [motion for rccusa l ]  I 04 F. 
Supp. 2d 334 (2000). opin ion by U . S. District J udge Lewis A. Kaplan. 
1 7c USA Today. "DVD Hacker " Vows Lengthy Court Battle (January 30. 2002) .  Bangkok Post, Don 't 
Copr This A t  Home (January 23 .  2002) .  V N U  Business Publ ications.  Ltd. Hacker Mag Takes On US 
Court (January 1 6. 2002) .  N ordic  Business Report, Norwegian A uthorities Charge Teenager Software 
A uthor (January 1 4. 2002).  
subsequent generation of copy, the DVD player could make copies with virtual ly no 
quality degradation. The defendant, Shawn Reimerdes, posted the DeCSS code on a 
Web site he co-operated, 2600 Enterpri ses, Inc . ,  a site devoted to computer software 
developers and specifical ly "hacking." 1 73 
I n  making their case. Universal c ited the DMCA anti-circumvention provi sion 
that states in  part, 
"No person shall c ircumvent a technological measure that effectively controls 
access to a work protected under this tit le." 1 74 
Since DeCSS clearly meets the definit ion of an anti-circumvention device, the 
case seemed open and shut. However, there are exceptions to the anti-circumvention 
provisions. These exceptions could make anti-circumvention legal and render 
corporate information unprotected. The DeCSS developers claimed to be reverse-
engineering the CSS program in an effort to create DVD-player software for the 
Linux operating system, software that was at the time unavailable. 1 75 Under the 
DMCA, 
"a person who has lawful ly obtained the right to use a copy of a 
computer program may circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a particular portion of that program for 
the sole purpose of identifying and ana lyzing those elements of the 
program that are necessary to achieve interoperabi l i ty of an 
independently created computer program with other programs,  and 
that have not previously been readi ly  available to the person engaging 
1 73 See supra note 1 65 ,  the name "2600' has tel l i ng i nspirat ion. Second Circuit Court of Appeals  J udge 
Jon 0. Newman expla ins  '"2600" has special sign ificance to the hacker community. I t  is the hertz 
frequency of a signal that some hackers formerly used to explore the ent ire telephone system from 
'operator mode , '  whi ch was triggered by the transmission of a 2600 hertz tone across a telephone l ine, 
or to place telephone calls without incurring long-di stance toll  charges." 
m 1 7  U .S .C.  � 1 20 l ( a )( I ) (A )  
1 7' See supra note I 0 ,  part I I .  L inux i s  a n  operating system that competes with the M icrosoft W indows 
operating system. 
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in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and 
analysi s do not constitute infringement under this t it le ."m 
During the Corley tria l ,  another question of copyright balance rose to the 
court ' s  attention .  l f  a user buys a copyrighted work, does he or she gain the l egal right 
to manipulate that product so that it can be displayed using an alternative device, a 
capabili ty not otherwise avai lable with the copyrighted work? Section 1 20 1  (a)(3 )  
explains "to 'circumvent a technological measure '  means to descramble a scrambled 
work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, 
deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright 
owner. . . " 1 77 It was this provi sion the court appl ied in evaluating one prong of 
Corley's defense, which claimed that "an individual who buys a DVD has the 
' authority of the copyright owner' to view the DVD, and therefore is exempted from 
the DMCA pursuant to subsection 1 20 1  (a ) (3 ) (A)  when the buyer circumvents an 
encryption technology in order to view the DVD on a competing platform ( such as 
Linux) ."  
The court di sagreed. l n  an argument strikingly s imi lar to  the fair  use argument 
in the Reimerdes case, the court found that 1 20 1  (a ) (3 ) (A)  did in fact make it legal to 
decrypt protected material given copyright owner approval, but found that the 
provision did not give the right to look at the material in any circumstance. " [Section 
1 20 1  (a)(3)(A)]  exempts from l iabi l i ty those who would 'decrypt' an encrypted DVD 
with the authorization of a copyright owner, not those who would 'vi.ew'  a DVD with 
1 7(' 1 7  u.s.c. � 1 20 1 ( f)( 1 )  
1 77 1 7  U .S .C.  � 1 20 1 (a ) (3) (A ) .  
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the authorization of a copyright owner."m Again, the emphasis of this DMCA 
provi sion enforces the act of anti-circumvention, and not the use or m isuse of the 
copyrighted material itself. In other words, the DMCA makes breaking into a room 
i l legal , but says nothing about what you do in the room once you are in there. 
Surprisingly, the Corley defense did not invoke subsection 1 20 1  (f)(2) .  which 
says " . . .  a person may develop and employ technological means to circumvent a 
technological measure. or to circumvent protection afforded by a technological 
measure, in order to enable the identifi cation and analysi s under paragraph ( I ), or for 
the purpose o{enahling interoperahility o{an independently created computer 
program with other programs. [{such means are necesswy to achieve :wch 
interoperahili(v, to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement under 
this tit le." 1 79 Of course, the final phrase may el iminate this subsection as a defense of 
any kind. However, the Reimerdes team did offer this provision as a defense. 
"[Defendents] . . .  contend that DeCSS is necessary to achieve interoperabi l ity between 
computers running on the Linux system and DVDs and that this exception therefore i s  
satisfied."  1 80 
Unmoved by this interpretation, the court inval idated thi s  defense for three 
reasons .  First, the defendants offered no evidence to support the claim. Second, in a 
1 7x See supra note 1 65 ,  "Thi s  i s  actua l ly  what subsect ion 1 20 I (a)(3) (A)  means when read i n  
conjunction with the ant i-circumvention provisions. When read together with the anti -traffick ing 
provi sions, subsect i on 1 20 I (a) (3 )( A)  frees an i nd ividual to traffic i n  encryption technology designed or 
marketed to c ircumvent an encryption measure if the owner of the material protected by the encryption 
measure authorizes that c i rcumvention." 
1 79 1 7  U .S .  C .  § 1 20 I (f)(2) .  emphasi s added . The record shows that the Corley defense d id  invoke th i s  
prov ision as part of the i r  defense arguments i n  an earl ier court motion for sanct ions and other rel ief. 
The defense apparently  d id  not revis i t  th is  provis ion w i th the appeal s court a year l ater. See supra note 
1 65 .  
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rather short-sighted opinion, the court noted that whi le DeCSS runs under Linux, it 
also runs under Windows-"a far more widely used operat ing system." Therefore, 
defendents could not claim that DeCSS was designed solely for Linux . The court 
reasoned that because of the interoperabi l i ty of DeCSS,  i t  could not possibly be 
designed exclusively for Linux, a rul ing that seems to require that devices be 
designed with conscious regard for whether or not they produce interoperabi l i ty. 
Third, the court ruled that 1 20 1  (f) "permits reverse engineering of copyrighted 
computer programs only and does not authorize circumvention of technological 
h I h . I d k h . , J E J  systems t at contra access to ot er copyng 1te wor s ,  sue a s  movies . 
It would appear, then, that where access to information cha l k  _ -.·s copyright 
protection, specifical ly  in regard to provi sion 1 20 1  in the DMCA, courts are 
interpreting in favor of copyright ownership .  Admittedly, there are few decisions as 
this i s  written in early 2003 , and that smal l  sampl ing of subject matter has not 
produced a broad sample of decisions to evaluate Section 1 20 I .  Sti l l ,  with the 
deci sions result ing from Reimerdes and from Corley, the courts have interpreted the 
DMCA to primari l y  defend security of the copyright owner. "Now that the legal 
community has had an opportunity to test the DMCA in the courts," said cri tic Anna 
Claveria Brannan, "it is apparent that the new law needs to be amended, and the 
Internet culture needs to undergo a shift in its free-for-al l  based phi losophy."m 
l xo Univi'rsal Ci(r Studios inc. 1'. Ri'inwrdt's, R2 F. Supp. 2d .  2 1 1 :  2000 U .S. Dist .  L EX I S  906: 53  
U .S . P.Q.2D ( B N A )  1 7RO. l X I  ibid. 
l xc Brannan. Anna C1averia, Fair Use Doctrine and th<' Digital Millennium Coprright A ct: Does Fair 
Use Exist under the DA1CA "· Santa Clara Law Review. Vol . 42,  No .  1 (200 1 ). page 247. 
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B. Title I I  § 51 2. Limitations on l iabi l ity relating to material on l ine 
Though perhaps Jess contentious in  i t s  legislative history than the anti-
circumvention provisions , Section 5 1 2  of the DMCA also has come under 
criticism. 1 83 The provi sion seeks to provide "safe harbor" for Internet service 
providers that unknowingly post (or al low to be posted) copyright-protected material .  
Unfortunately, the legis lation found under 5 1 2  seems confusing and convoluted i n  the 
view of Boston College Law Professor Alfred C. Yen. 1 84 To enjoy protection from 
safe harbor, service providers must meet the fol lowing provi sions outl ined in Section 
5 1 2(c)( l ) (A) : 
1 .  [An Internet service provider must] not have actual knowledge that the 
material or an activity using the material on the system or network is 
infringing; 
2. In  the absence of such actual knowledge, [the ISP] i s  not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity i s  apparent; or 
3 .  Upon obtaining knowledge o r  awareness, [ ISP] acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material ;  
4. [The I SP]  does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and 
ability to control such activity; and 
5 .  Upon notification o f  claimed infringement . . .  [ the ISP] responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed 
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
Attorney Adam R. Fox has written, "Critics opine that ISPs may act to 
comply with accusations so zealously that they threaten to engender a countervai l ing 
1 x 3  Fox. Adam R. , The Digital Mil!f'nnium Copyright Act: Disabusing the Notion o(a Constitutional 
Moment. Rutgers Computer & Technology L . J .  Vol . 27 (200 I ) , cit ing A l fred C. Yen, Internet Servicf' 
Provider Liahilit\'for Suhscriba Cop1-right lnfi·ingnnf'nt, Enti:'rprise Liabiliz\', and the First 
A mendmi:'nl. 88 Geo. L .J . 1 833 ,  1 888 (2000) :  Ma l ia  Pollack, The Right to Knmr!: Delimiting Databa.\·1:' 
Protection at the Juncture o(thf' Commerce Clause, the Intellectual ProperZ\' Clause and the First 
A mendment, 1 7  Cardozo Arts & Ent. L . J .  4 7. I 08- 1 09 ( 1 999) .  
1 x4 Alfred C. Yen. Internet Service Prm·ider Liahiliz\'frJr Suhscrihcr Copyright lnfi·ingement, 
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendnwnt. 88 Georgetown Law Journal 1 833 .  pg. 1 878  (2000) .  
Professor Yen wrote that  the entire DMC A 's ''cumbersome and d isorganized structure makes i t s  
prov isions d ifficult  to untangle." 
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infringement of the First Amendment rights of web page owners and I SP 
customers ."  1 85 Section 5 1 2  was designed to al low onl ine service providers (or Internet 
service providers) the abi l ity to avoid l iabi l ity by removing copyright infringing 
material from their servers once they became aware of the infringing materia l .  This 
arrangement requires the copyright owner to notify the I SP of the infringing materia l .  
That notification found at 5 1 2( c ) (3)(A) must  "substantia l ly" comply with the 
fol lowing: 
1 .  A physical or electronic s ignature of a person authorized to act on behalf 
of the owner of an exclusive right that i s  al legedly infringed. 
2 .  Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, 
if multiple copyrighted works at a single onl ine site are covered by a 
single notification, a representative l i st of such works at that site. 
3 .  Identification of the material that i s  claimed t o  b e  infringing o r  to b e  the 
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which 
is to be disabled, and information reasonably  sufficient to permit the 
service provider to locate the materia l .  
4. Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact 
the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if  
avai lable, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may 
be contacted. 
5 .  A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of 
the material in the manner complained of i s  not authorized by the 
copyright owner, its agent, or the law. 
6. A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under 
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on 
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is  al legedly infringed. 1 x6 
However, in an interesting twi st of the legi slation, once the ISP  has removed 
content in response to this notification, a counter-notification may be sent to the I SP 
claiming that, in fact, the material was not infringing. That not ification must 
"substantial ly" include the fol lowing, as outl ined in  Section 5 1 2(g)(3 ) :  
J X '  Fox. Adam R . ,  The Digital Millennium Coprright A ct: Disabusing the Notion of'a Constitutional 
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1 .  A physical or electronic s ignature of the subscriber. 
2 .  I dentification of the material that has  been removed or  to which access has 
been di sabled and the location at which the material appeared before it 
was removed or access to i t  was disabled. 
3 .  A statement under penalty o f  perjury that the subscriber has a good faith 
belief that the material was removed or disabled as  a result of mistake or 
misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled. 
4. The subscriber's name, address, and telephone number, and jurisdiction of 
Federal District Court for the judicial di strict in  which the address is 
located, or if the subscriber ' s  address is outside the United States, for any 
judicial district in which the service provider may be found, and that the 
subscriber wi l l  accept service of process from the person who provided 
notification under subsection ( c ) ( 1 ) (C)  or an agent of such person. 1 87 
Of concern i s  the notion that the ISP  may employ a strong-arm tactic 
removing online material in an effort to avoid copyright infringement l iabi l i ty, and 
thereby squeeze the publ ic 's  F irst Amendment privi leges. 1 88 Alfred Yen, who has 
written numerous articles on copyright, 1 89 warned in  regard to Section 5 1 2  of the 
DMCA, "to the extent that society cares about the free speech impl ications of 
copyright, the DMCA 's safe harbors are problematic . . .  Courts must not impute 
.Moment. R utgers Computer & Technology L . J .  Vol . 27 (200 1  ). page 26X. 
I R(l 1 7  U .S .C.  § 5 1 2(c)(3 )(A ) . 
I R7 1 7  U .S .C.  § 5 J 2 (g)(3) .  I RX See supra note 1 84 .  1 x9 Alfred C. Yen. Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. A Personal 
lnjurr Law Perspective on Copyright in an Internet Age: A Preliminarr Economic Analysis ofNapstl:'r: 
lntl!rnet Technology, Copyright Liahilitr, and the Possibilitr ofCoasean Bargaining: Internet Savice 
Pro1 ·ider Liabilitvfor Subscriber Copyright lnfi'ingement, Enterprisl:' Liahilit\', and the First 
Amendment; Copyright Opinions and A esthetic Theon·: A Statistical Analrsis ofAsian American 
Experience in the Affirmative A ction Hiring ofLaw Facultr: The Legan· ofFeist: The Consequences of 
a Weak Connection Between Copyright  and the Economics ofPuhlic Goods: When Authors Won 't Sell: 
Parod1·. Fair Use and Efficien(y in Cop_l'right Lmr: Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor 
and Possession; A First Amendment Perspectil'e on the ldea/Erpres.1ion Dichotomv and Copyright in a 
Work '.1· " Total Concept and Feel. " 
knowledge to I SPs for purposes of contributory infringement unless i t  i s  quite c lear 
that infringement has occurred. ISPs wi l l  otherwise respond by treating al l complaints 
of infringements as actual infringements, overzealously enforcing copyright and 
d . . b "b f h 
. 
fi h . h " I ')() epnvmg su sen ers o t e1r ree speec n g  ts .  
Yen made the argument that the DMCA itself wi l l  damage future l it igation 
that would have served to strengthen exi sting law. He argues that the ambiguities 
within that exist ing law with regard to new technology would have been improved 
through case law, and a more equitable solution may have resulted, providing a better 
balance of copyright protection and free speech. Furthermore, Yen asserted that I SPs 
wi l l  be tempted to take self-preserving actions ,  removing questionable materia ls  first, 
and asking questions later. Final ly, Yen claims that by fil ing lawsuits, content 
providers can serve l SPs with a de facto temporary restraining order, in effect 
. . d fi 
. I I 'l l  removmg content 1 11 e 1 111te y. 
1 90 See supra note l R4. pg. 5 1 -52 .  1 9 1  See supra note l R4. pg. 52-53 .  "The DMCA ' s  safe harbor scheme creates F irst Amendment 
problems in three ways. First. i t  oss i fies and perpetuates ambiguities in ex ist ing law that encourage 
I SPs to indiscriminately remove materia l  from the I nternet . . .  A correct read ing of contributory 
i nfringement exposes I SPs to l iabi l i ty only i f  the content provider's compla int  establ i shes a strong case 
for copyright infringement. However. existing ambiguit ies in the law arc l arge enough to make risk 
averse I SPs behave more defensively than necessary. These I SPs will remove material from the 
I nternet even if no strong case for infringement exists. l f the DMCA did not exist. there would l i kely 
be future l i ti gation i n  which courts could clari fy and strengthen exist ing law. thereby reducing 
uncertainty and the need for I SPs to behave defensively. However, many I SPs w i l l  l i kely take 
advantage of the DMC A ' s  safe harbors. thereby reducing the chances that courts will have the 
opportunity to clarify and strengthen existing law. This wi l l  tend to make i ncentives for i nd iscri mi nate 
removal of material from the I nternet a permanent feature of the legal landscape. 
"Second, the DMC A ' s  safe harbor scheme increases the i ncent ive for i nd iscriminate removal of 
material by protect ing I SPs from actions by their subscribers. As noted earlier, I SPs that remove a 
subscriber 's  speech from the I nternet run the smal l .  but real .  risk that the subscriber wi l l  sue. The 
DMC A operates by providing ri sk averse I SPs complete protection from thi s problem. As long as lSPs 
remove materia l  upon the formal request of content providers and fol low DMCA procedures. 
subscribers arc barred from recovery. This makes removing contested material from the I nternet even 
more attractive than it a lready i s .  
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I n  one of the more notorious trials that tackled the language in  Section 5 1 2 , a 
handful  of music companies sued Napster, Inc.  for copyright infringement. 1 'J2 
Napster, a peer-to-peer I nternet s i te, provided its users with the abi li ty to post a l i st of 
their own music files online. Users can then browse other l i sts  and download any 
music they l ike from another user 's  J i st .  The Napster site fac i l i tated this activity and a 
host of music companies,  headl ined by  A&M Records, sued the site for copyright 
infringement . 1 93 During the tria l ,  Napster argued, in part, that its l iabi l ity for 
contributory and vicarious infringement was l imited by the D igital Mi l lennium 
Copyright Act, Section 5 1 2 . 1 94 The court di sagreed . "Napster attempts to persuade the 
court that subsection 5 1 2(d) provides an appl icable safe harbor. However, this 
subsection expressly excludes from protection any defendant who has ' actual 
knowledge that the material or activity is infringing, ' 5 1 2( d)( I ) (A) ,  or ' i s  aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. "' 1 95 
"Third, the DMCA 's safe harbor scheme exacerbates the effect of any m istaken action against speech 
by effectively c ircumvent ing the procedures that would normally protect a copyright defendant from 
unjusti fi ed curta i lment of her free speech rights. As noted earli er. subscribers can deny the existence of 
infringement and thereby prompt ISPs  to restore d i sputed materia l  to the I nternet in not less than ten 
nor more than fourteen business days. However. if the content provider fi les suit and gives notice of 
the suit to the JSP before restoration occurs. the I S P  must keep the d i sputed materia l  off of the I nternet 
i n  order to maintain its safe harbor. As a practical matter. a content provider need only fi le  a lawsuit to 
get an a l leged copyright i nfringement removed from the I nternet pending the outcome of l i t igation .  
This i s  tantamount to awarding the content provider a temporary restra in ing order and prel iminary 
i nj unct ion without any hearing before a court or the post ing of a bond .  Once again.  if this happened 
only in clear cases of infringement. the Fi rst Amendment concerns might not be terribly large. 
However. I SPs wi l l  l ikely apply thi s  very procedure to "statement of good faith"' cases in which 
subscribers have not actual ly committed copyright infringement. Such a result i s  highly problematic 
because i nj unctions aga inst speech arc genera l ly disfavored. especia l ly before tria l ."  
1 92 A & M  Records, Inc. ''· Napster. Inc. ,  2 3 9  F .  3d  1 004 (200 1 ) .  
1 93 Plaint iffs in  the  tria l  i nc luded: A&M Records, Geffen Records. l nterscopc Records. Sony M usic 
Entertainment, MC A Records. Atlantic Recording Corp . ,  I sland Records. Motown Record Co . .  and 
Capitol Records, Jerry L ieber Music.  and M ike Stol ler and Frank M usic Corp. 
1 94 A & M  Records, Inc. v. Napster. Inc . ,  1 1 4 F .  Supp. 2d at 9 1 9  n24 (2000) .  Usc of the DMC A 
provision as a safe harbor was shot down. "This find ing a l so puts to an end defendant ' s  persist 
attempts to i nvoke the protection of the Digita l  M i l l ennium Copyright Act, 1 7  U . S. C . .  Section 5 1 2 ."  
1 9� /hid. 
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But consider that Napster was not directl y  infringing the rights of the 
plaintiffs . That was uncontested. 1 96 What Napster suppl ied was a technological tool .  
When Universal Ci ty Studios sued Sony for its production and sale of VCRs, the 
plaintiff argued that Sony was l i able for the copyright infringement committed by its 
consumers . 1 '!7 However, the court reasoned that a tool that had a significant 
technological use could not be outlawed because of the actions taken by some of the 
consumers who bought the tool . 1 98 
Given a different circumstance, would another I SP err on the side of caution 
and remove material that could be infringing in an effort to take advantage of safe 
harbor protection from l iabi l i ty? Certainly the Napster case presents a rather obvious 
exploitation of copyright ownership, but that case law may now serve the interests of 
future cases, some of which could involve more tenuous infringement circumstances. 
In another test of Section 5 1 2 , a plaintiff sued an ISP  for al lowing a 
newsgroup to post copyrighted photographs on the JSP's  server. ALS Scan was in the 
business of "creating and marketing 'adult' photographs ." 1 'J9 RemarQ was an ISP and 
provided Internet access for two news groups that contai ned hundreds of postings that 
infringed ALS Scan ' s  copyrights.  ALS Scan wrote a "cease and desist" letter to 
RemarQ, asking the JSP to cease carrying the offending newsgroups .  RemarQ refused 
ALS Scan ' s  demands, but did respond by requesting that ALS Scan identify 
I %  I n  A &M Rl:'cords \'. Napsta. plaint iffs a l leged that Napster was  a "contributory and  vicarious 
copyright i nfringer." 1 97 • · Sei:' supra note 1 6R. 
1 9x Copyright Law Professors in  Support of ReversaL A mi cus Curiae brief, Appeal Nos.  00- 1 640 1 and 
00- 1 6403 , Napster. inc. 1 '. A & M  Records, inc. Consort ium of 1 8  copyright law professors, i ncluding 
Jessica Litman. Wayne State University Law School, A l fred Yen.  Boston College Law SchooL and 
Diane Zimmerman. New York Uni versity School of Law. 
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individual infringing i tems "with sufficient specificity" so that RemarQ could 
el iminate them.200 ALS Scan took RemarQ to court .  
RemarQ' s  defense centered on ALS Scan not providing proper not ification of 
infringement, as prescribed in 5 1 2(c)(3 ) (A) .  "RemarQ argues in response that i t  did 
not have 'knowledge of the infringing activity as a matter of law, ' stating that the 
DMCA protects i t  from l iabi l i ty because 'ALS Scan fai led to i dentify the infringing 
works in compl iance with the Act, and RemarQ fal l s  within the safe harbor provisions 
of the Act. " ' 
Furthermore, RemarQ argued that whi le  some of the photographs on the 
newsgroup were copyright ALS Scan, others were not . So removal of the entire 
newsgroup a lso would  have e l iminated non-infringing activity. However, ALS Scan 
claimed the newsgroups served no other purpose than to distribute ALS Scan ' s  
copyrighted materia ls ,  and therefore, b y  directing RemarQ t o  the site, i t  had also 
directed RemarQ to a representative l ist of infringing materia ls .  The court agreed, 
saying "ALS Scan provided RemarQ with information that ( 1 )  identified two sites 
created for the sole purpose of publ i shing ALS Scan ' s  copyrighted works, ( 2 )  
asserted that virtua l ly a l l  the images a t  the two sites were i t s  copyrighted materia l ,  
and (3 )  referred RemarQ to two web addresses where RemarQ could find pictures of 
ALS Scan ' s  models and obtain ALS Scan ' s  copyright information ."20 1 
Again, Alfred Yen 's  warning appl ies .  In  ALS Scan v. RemarQ, even a 
notification that did not meet the requirements of the DMCA was sufficient to remove 
1 99 ALS Scan. Inc. 1 '. RemarQ Communities, Inc . ,  239 F. 3d 6 1 9  (200 1 ) . 
::oo !hid, at I n5.  
:: oJ  Ibid, at I l l  n20. 
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safe harbor from the I SP .  Would ,  therefore, an ISP become more zealous in its effort 
to remove any potential ly infringing materia l  in an effort to avoid l i abi l i ty? 
America Onl ine a lso entered the 5 1 2  fray when i t  came under fire for hosting 
pages that contained i l l egal copies of author Harlan E l l i son 's work.202 AOL invoked 
Section 5 1 2  when it c la imed safe harbor under 5 1 2(a) ,  "a service provider sha l l  not be 
l i able for monetary rel ief. . .  by reason of . . .  transmitting, routing, or providing 
connections for, materia l  through a system or network . . .  " and 5 1 2( c) ,  "a service 
provider sha l l  not be l i able for monetary rel ief. . .  by reason of the storage at the 
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network . . .  " On the contrary, 
the p laintiffs invoked a 5 1 2  clause of their own. In a strategic move, the pla int iffs 
attempted to turn the defense's law back on itself. A specific provision within 5 1 2  
seemed to undermine qual ification for safe harbor. Under 5 1 2( i ) ,  "al l  safe-harbor 
provi sions establ i shed by the DMCA sha l l  apply to a service provider only i f  the 
service provider:" 
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider' s system or network of, a policy that 
provides for the tem1ination in appropriate c ircumstances of subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat 
infringers ; and (B)  accommodates and does not interfere with standard 
technical measures. 
In  essence, the Ellison team argued that because AOL did not give a warning 
as prescribed in 5 1 2( i ) ,  then AOL could not take advantage of safe harbor. The U .S .  
D istrict Court of  Central Cal ifornia rel ied on  the DMCA ' s l egis lative h istory 
coc Ellison 1 '. Robertson, 1 89 F. Supp. 2d 1 05 1 :  U .S. Dist. L EX l S  4 1 66:  62 U .S .P .  Q.2D ( B N A )  1 1 70 
(2002) .  "Plaint iff Harlan E l l i son i s  the author of many works of fact and fiction, particularly sci ence: 
regarding 5 1 2( i )  to determine i f  a l ack of proper warning to repeat offenders was 
cause for el iminating safe harbor provi sions :  
The committee [ i s  not] suggesting that a provider must investigate 
possible in.fi'ingements, monitor its service, or make difficult 
judgements as to whether conduct is or is not infi·inging. However, 
those who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet 
through disrespect for the inte J Jectual property rights of others should 
know that there i s  a real i st ic threat of losing that access. 203 
"In the face of such clear guidance from the legi slative hi story of the DMCA, 
subsection ( i )  cannot be interpreted to require ISPs to take affirmative steps to 
investigate potential infringement and set up notification procedures in an attempt to 
ident ify the responsible individual s ."204 The warning speJ Jed out in 5 1 2( i )  could be 
interpreted as a requirement of the I SP  to actively pol ice its contents.  However, the 
court ' s  rul ing seems to contradict that reading. The legi slative history clearly did not 
require the ISP to actively seek out repeat infringers, and yet subsection ( i )  requires 
the ISP  to post a warning to repeat infringers, threatening the loss of their 
subscriptions .  
A final twist to  Section 5 1 2  involves a potentia J Jy harmful  contradiction. A 
reading of Section 5 1 2(c)( I ) (C)  seems to exonerate ISPs from l iabi l ity given 
"expeditious" removal of infringing material , or disabling of access to that material . 
However, Section 5 1 2( c ) ( 1 ) (B) says an ISP shaJJ not be l iable if  the ISP  "does not 
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activi ty. in a case in 
fiction." [America Online. RemarQ Communities, Critical Path, and Citizen 5 13 were a lso named as 
defendants and charges were dropped aga inst all but AOL before the case came to tria l . ]  
203 H . R .  Rep. 1 05-55 1 P. I I . a t  pg. 6 1  ( Ju ly  2 2 .  1 99S). '04 - See supra note 202. at n 1 4 . 
79 
h . h h . 'd I h . h d h ., . I h - . . "20' S w zc t e servtce pro l 't er ws t e ng t an a 1 t ty to contra sue acttvtty. . .  - o 
the ISP  i s  faced with a potential catch-22.  When a copyright owner informs an ISP  of 
infringing materia l ,  the ISP  must remove or di sable access to that material i n  order to 
comply with Section 5 1 2 ( c)(  I (C) .  However, if  the ISP  removes or disables access to 
the material , then the I SP shows that it does in fact have "the right and abi l ity to 
control such activity," a provi sion that abol i shes an ISP ' s  c laim on safe harbor at 
Section 5 1 2( c ) ( 1 ) (B) .  Granted, the provis ion under 5 1 2( c)(  I ) (B)  appl ies only to I SPs 
receiving financial benefit from the activity. However, in  future challenges , that 
requirement may sometimes be an actual direct benefit, or financial benefit could be 
proven by demonstrat ing increased activity to a particular portion of the I SP ' s  
content-thereby driving membership and advertising revenue. 
The Ellison v. Robertson court approached this  subject in some deta i l ,  relying 
heavi ly on an earl ier deci sion, Hendrickson v. eBay for guidance.20(' In that deci sion, a 
web user had posted an adverti sement for sel l ing copies of a movie entitled Manson 
on the I nternet site eBay-an auction web site where users are able to buy and sell 
goods by posting messages about goods for sale. Buyers bid on the goods and the 
highest bidder is awarded the sale. I n  the Hendrickson case, the defendant, Robert 
Hendrickson , claimed he owned the copyright for the movie Manson, and the copies 
being offered for sale were pirated, and therefore because eBay was hosting the 
transaction, eBay was contributing to copyright infringement.207 Under the DMCA 
..., {).:; � . 
· - 1 7  � 5 1 2(c )( l ) (B ). emphasis added. 
2116 Hendrickson v. eBuy. 1 65 F. Supp. 2d l 082 ( 200 l ) . 
207 /hid. 
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Section 5 1 2(  c)(  1 ) , eBay was exonerated because Hendrickson had not fol lowed 
DMCA protocol in notifying eBay of the infringement.20s 
The Ellison court ci ted the eBay decision regarding 5 1 2 . "The court reasoned 
that because the DMCA specifical ly  requires I SPs to remove or block access to 
infringing material s in  order to avai l themselves of the l imi tation on l iabi l ity found in 
subsection 5 1 2(c) ,  the 'right and abil ity to control ' must mean something more than 
the abi l ity to delete or block access to infringing material s after the fact .  Otherwise, 'a 
service provider' loses immunity under the safe-harbor provi sion of the DMCA 
because it engages in acts that are specifical l y  required by the DMCA."209 The Ellison 
court felt  that Congress would surely not write two subsections that clearly pit 
themselves against one another. Instead, the Ellison court reasoned, "the DMCA 
requires more than the mere abi l ity to delete and block access to infringing material 
after that material has been posted in  order for the ISP to be said to have ' the right 
and abi l ity to control such activity. "'2 1 0 In  deciding the 5 1 2  i ssue: 
" . . .  AOL had no . . .  abil ity to go after Robertson personal ly here 
[by contrast to Netcom ' s  abi l ity to go after Erl ich i n  the Religious 
Technology Center v. Net com case] . Rather, i t  found itself in the same 
situation as every other I SP  in the world that had entered into peer 
agreements . . .  I t  could delete or block users ' access to the infringing 
postings, but it could not do anything to restrict the infringing activity 
at the root l evel . 
cOR Ibid. See al so, www.kentlavv.cdu stutknt orgs /jip.'copy/Hcndrickson.htm [ last v i sited Apri l 9. 
2003] .  
'The Court specifical ly found that Plaintiffs  not ice to eBay i n  form o f  e-mai l  o r  telephonic 
· conversations were defective because they did not have a proper signature: despite requests by eBay. 
they did not specifical ly ident ify the material by number: and the c-mai l s  from Plaint i ff did not have 
the required statements of good fai th and representation of accuracy under penalty of perj ury." 
209 See supra note 202. at I .  2 1 0  See supra note 202, a t  I .  
X I  
"The Court holds that AOL ' s abi l ity to delete or block access 
to Robertson ' s  postings of infringing material after those postings had 
already found their way onto AOL' s  U S ENET servers was insufficient 
to constitute ' the right and abil ity to control infringing activity' as the 
term is  used in the context of vicarious copyright infringement."2 1 1  
1 t  i s  worth noting, that the Ellison court found that AOL "could not do 
anything to restrict the infringing activity at the root level" of a peer agreement-a 
similar agreement once found at Napster.com, who was ruled quite capable of 
restricting infringing activity.2 1 2  The somewhat murky finding in  the Ellison case did 
not give I SPs reason to breath easy. Had E l l i son shown that AOL had financial ly 
benefited from the infringing activity, AOL may have been found l iable under 
Section 5 1 2 . That close call may add to an ISP ' s  l iabi l ity fears . Such a state of 
concern could intensify and broaden an ISP 's  efforts to comply with the super-
cautious readings of Section 5 1 2  of the DMCA. Self-censorship to avoid the specter 
of l iabi l ity for copyright infringement could result in the removal of non-infringing 
material from web sites. 
2 1 1  See supra note 202. at I .  ' I '  
- - See supra note 1 92 .  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
In  an effort to meet the coming technological advancements and threats 
presented most prominently by the Intemet, Congress responded with the D igital 
Mi l lennium Copyright Act. Since its inception, it has come under fairl y  s ignificant 
criticism, as this thesi s  has noted. The impetus for creating this legislation was the 
resul t  of the same fear of p iracy that Noah Webster had in  the 1 780s when he wrote 
his Engl ish primer. 
The fear of digital piracy is certain ly not unfounded.  Copyright industries have 
reported astoni shing losses. U .S .  Deputy Assi stant Attomey General John Malcolm,  
who i s  in charge of the Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section of the 
Department of Justice (CCIPS) said in 2002 that "U.S .  copyright industries reported 
losses of nearly $22 bi l l ion doll ars due to overseas piracy. After I 0 years growth, 
global music sales declined in 200 I by 5 percent, and are down even more this year, 
largely due to software piracy."2 1 3 
l t  i s  unknown how M alcolm or anyone else i s  arriving at any rel iable figures for 
the cost of piracy. Total music sales were down 5 percent, but the question of why 
those sales were down l ikely has a compli cated answer, affected by a combination of 
variables in  the market. But regardless of the accuracy of the data, there has been-at 
the very least-a perception of rampant piracy. 
21 3 \llalcolm, John. Deputy Assi stant Attorney General .  in a speech entit led Importance of/P to 
A merican Economy. presented for the Progress and Freedom Foundat ion i n  Aspen. Colorado ( A ugust 
20. 2002). www.techlawjournal .comiintelpro/20020� 1 9 .asp [ last vi sited March 3 1 ,  2003 ] .  
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"Twenty-three percent of respondents said that they are not buying more music 
because they can download it or copy it for free on the Internet," said H i lary Rosen, 
president of the Recording Industry Association of America, c i ting research the RIAA 
commissioned.2 1 4 "Over 50 percent of respondents who downloaded free music said 
that they made copies of i t  as we1 1 ."2 1 5  "According to industry estimates, over 2 .6 
b i l l ion music fi les are downloaded i l legal l y  every month," reported the Briti sh 
B d . c 
. 7 ] 6  roa castmg orporat10n. � 
Be it accurate or exaggerated, thi s  piracy resulted in  the 1 998 DMCA, which five 
years later was at the center of a copyright debate, and had earned more than its fair  
share of controversy. The stated purpose of the law, and the actual outcome of the law 
may be at  odds . Tom Bl i l ey (R-VA) said during the House floor debate on H.R .  228 1 ,  
August 4, 1 998,  "Copyright law i s  not just about protecting information. I t ' s  j ust as 
much about affording reasonable access to i t  as a means of keeping our democracy 
healthy and doing what the Constitution says copyright law i s  a l l  about: promoting 
' Progress in Science and the useful  Arts . '  If  thi s bill ceases to strike that balance, i t  
wi l l  no longer deserve Congress ' or the publ i c ' s  support ."2 1 7 However, the 
desirabi l ity of preserving that balance in achieving the spirit of copyright i s  
questioned in  a t  least two of the DMCA's  provisions, Title I ,  Section 1 20 1 ,  and Title 
I I ,  Section 5 1 2 . 
c l 4  Pruitt. Scarlet, Online Piracy Blumed fhr Drop in CD Sales ( February 25, 2002) ,  
www.pcworld .com/news1art ic le/O.aid,X6326.00.asp. [ l ast vi s i ted M arch 3 1 ,  2003] .  
c l 5  Ibid. c 1 6 5/Jears Warns Against Pira(y ( September 26. 2002), 
news.bbc.co.uk/ 1 /hi/enterta i nment/music/221\3072 .stm. [ last v is i ted March 3 I ,  2003] . 
.:> 1 7 Bl i ley. Tom. ( R-VA)  House floor debate on H . R .  22S I ,  the Digital M i l lennium Copyright Act 
( August 4 .  1 998) .  
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The anti-circumvention provi sion, Section 1 20 I ,  was written, in part, to give 
copyright owners protection from piracy. Without protection, "the owners of 
intel l ectual property are going to be unwil l ing to put their materia l  onl ine. "2 1  x But 
even in  the DMCA's  legislative gestation period, Congress recognized the need to 
address balance and to fortify fair use. "This b i l l  makes sure that l ibraries acting in 
good faith can never be subject to fines or civi l  damages. Spec i fical ly,  a l ibrary i s  
exempt from monetary l i abi l i ty i n  a c ivi l suit if  i t  was not aware and had n o  reason to 
bel ieve that its acts consti tuted a violation."2 1 9 
While these qual ifications seem to exempt l ibrarians and other fair users from 
l iabil i ty, it does nothing to provide access for l ibrarians and fair  users to the protected 
material . The original quandary was two-pronged, but Congress'  solution is one-
pronged. The copyright owners sought protection from piracy. The fair  users sought 
continuation of free access to materia l  for non-infringing uses. The nature of the 
debate ensures that nearly any solution wi l l  utterly fai l  to sati sfy both needs .  It is a 
problem that requires each side of the debate to yield some territory. However, the 
DMCA fai l s  to strike balance by insuring fair users are provided with copyright 
protection that affords access to digita l  information .  
Section 1 20 1  contains flawed l anguage that fai l s  to  adequately  address fair use 
and a proper definition of circumvention. Section 1 20 1  makes unauthorized access of 
copyrighted information i l legal . I t  does not address, however, what is done with the 
information once access i t  is  accompl i shed. In other words, Section 1 20 1  is much l ike 
e l k  Leahy. Patrick, ( D-VT) Senate floor debate o n  Senate version o f  the b i l l S .  2037. the Digital 
M i l lenn ium Copyright Act ( May 6. 1 998) .  
" 1 9  Ibid. 
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a breaking-and-entering provision.  Again, under the DMCA Section 1 20 1 ,  it i s  i l legal 
to break into a room, but once you ' re in the room, Section 1 20 I does not address 
what you do with the information inside the room. Therefore, as attorney and 
intel lectual property law special i st Gary Shapiro noted during his testimony before 
the House, "the acts prohibited by [the DMCA ' s] terms are not tied to infringement of 
. 720 copynghts. " �  
The Digi tal Mi l lennium Copyright Act did not legi slate copyright law. I t  did 
legi slate access to copyrighted materia l .  And to the di smay of fair  users, by and large 
the DMCA reduces free access to information on the Internet. That reduction i s  a 
result of Congress trying to find level-achieving copyright balance between 
encouragement of creativity and freedom of access to information. 
Perhaps Section 1 20 I would have been better written had i t  al lowed for 
circumvention of security devices specifical ly for non-infri nging users, as Shapiro 
recommended. That seemingly subtle difference would have persuaded courts to 
consider fair use when evaluating anti-circumvention circumstances. As it stands, the 
DMCA anti -circumvention provi sion is rather l ike having legis lation against murder 
with no self-defense provision. 
St i l l ,  al lowing circumvention for the purposes of non-infringing activity 
would require copyright owners to pol ice their users regularly and ascertain each 
user's intent. Even then, copyright owners would be at the mercy of their consumers' 
honesty. Once a digital copy is made, i t  can be made again ad infinitum with virtual ly 
:'co See supra note 8 1 .  Shapiro. Gary J .. Hearing on H . R .  228 1 before the House Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications. Trade. and Consumer Protection ( J une 5. 1 998) .  
no quality degradation. So even one scofflaw could cause considerable harm to a 
copyright owner. 
One cri tic of the claims regarding onl ine piracy suggests that the Internet and 
digital revolution are not damaging to copyright owners, but simply change the 
business model . Perhaps musicians, for example, can no longer expect to make 
mi l lions  of dollars on CD sales. Instead, other avenues of income must be exploited-
concert sales, T -shirt sales, advert ising, etc. 22 1 "Trading and onl ine piracy i s  probably  
the greatest chal lenge facing Variety.com' s  industry-the entertainment business-
today, but the question for us i s  not 'how can we stop this? ' Instead, i t ' s  'how can we 
take advantage ofthis? "'222 For now, onl ine piracy has resul ted i n  the copyright 
industries demanding action. And it is easy for Congress to understand the pl ight of 
the copyright owner. What is  perhaps more difficult to accept, is the association of the 
'progress of Science and useful Arts '  with the free access of information. Just as 
copyright protection encourages creative thought, it must not be permitted to hang the 
fruit  of that creativity from branches that no one can reach. 
Final ly, the definition of circumvention leaves the real possibi l i ty of 
hampering legitimate technological designs.  According to the DMCA, circumvention 
means "avoiding, b ypassing, removing, deactivating, or. . .  impairing" a technological 
measure .223 Any device, therefore, that does not respond to a security measure is, in 
effect, avoiding or bypassing a technological measure. Thi s seems to create an 
e e l  Smith, Travis, Editor, Variety.com. in comments regard ing onl i ne piracy (May  L 200 I ) . 
fol iomag.com/ar/marketing� onl i ne �piracy. 
ee2 Ibid. 
en 1 7  U .S .C � 1 20 l (b)( l ) (A ) .  
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electronic designers ' nightmare, adapting al l  designs to a l l  potential security systems, 
no matter how obscure or outdated. 
I f  the debate regarding Section 1 20 1  easi ly translates into an abstract compari son 
between copyright ownership versus  freedom of information, then Section 5 1 2 , the 
l imited l iabi lity provi sion, is a far more complicated study of that comparison. In 5 1 2 , 
the DMCA provided l iab i l i ty protection to Internet service providers, often credited 
with blazing the Internet frontier. "The notion that service providers should not bear 
the responsibi l i ty for copyright infringements when they are solely transmitting the 
materia l  is one key to the future growth of the I nternet," said Senator Ashcroft .224 
So in effort to encourage the growth of the Internet, Congress enacted bold 
legislation to al leviate l iabi l ity concerns for innocent service providers potential ly  
caught in copyright cross fires. Section 5 1 2  sets up  a detai led checkl i st of  steps to  take 
when copyright infringement has taken place. There are distinct steps outl ined for the 
copyright owner, the ISP ,  and even the users of infonnation who believe they have 
unj ustly lost access to information. 
While Congress spoke regularly of protecting I SPs (and OSPs-online service 
providers) from l iabi l i ty, crediting such services with responsibi l i ty for the growth of 
the Internet, perhaps they targeted I SPs as easy-to-reach agents of innumerable 
Internet users, otherwise known only by l ifeless IP  addresses and cryptic usernames. 
When a copyright owner or an agent of that owner found copyrighted material 
224  Senator John Ashcroft ( R-MO),  Senate floor debate on S. 2037.  the Digital M i l lenn ium Copyright 
Act ( May 1 4, 1 99g) .  
avai lable on the I nternet, what recourse did that person have?225 Often the only 
avai lable agent was the I SP, and purposeful ly,  that is  what the DMCA focuses upon. 
If a user finds i l legal ly posted copyrighted material on the Internet, that user can 
send a Jetter of copyright proof to the I SP  requesting that the offending material be 
removed or access to i t  disabled. Upon the JSP ' s  removing the materia l ,  another user 
may send a counter letter to the ISP claiming that the material was removed 
improperly, and shou ld  be reinstated. 226 
Critics of 5 1 2  have claimed a general tendency by courts to find in  favor of the 
copyright complainant, ri sking, they say, the l ikeli hood that I SPs wi l l  become 
squeamish in regard to the presence of questionable onl ine materia l .227 After a l l ,  the 
crit ics argue, if an I S P  defaults by removing material in question, then the I SP can 
take advantage of the safe harbor provi sion . So, I SPs will always err on the side of 
playing i t  safe by removing material-meaning less material avai lable for the Internet 
user. 
But the Ellison case, discussed in Chapter IV, brings doubt to the ISP ' s  
eligibi lity for safe harbor. In a contradictory pair of  provisions, Section 5 1 2  seems to 
::.2' Sec Floor statements accompanying i ntroduction of S. 1 1 2 1 .  WI PO Copyright and Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty I mplementation Act ( J uly 29. 1 997)�  Hearing on H . R .  22X I and H . R. 2 1  flO 
before the House Subcommittee on Courts and I ntel lectual Property ( September 1 6  and 1 7 . 1 997) :  H .  
Rept. 1 05-55 1 .  P . l .  Report o f  the House J udiciary Committee on H . R .  2 2 fl  1 .  W I  P O  Copyright Treaty 
I mplementation Act ( May 22.  1 998):  Senate floor debate on Senate version of the b i l l .  S. 2037. the 
Digital M il lennium Copyright Act ( May 1 4. 1 998):  H .  Rcpt. 1 05-55 1 P . l l .  Report of H ouse Commerce 
Committee on H . R .  228 1 .  the Digital M i l lennium Copyright Act ( Ju ly 22.  1 998) :  H ouse floor deba�c 
on H . R .  228 1 ,  the Digital M i l l ennium Copyright Act (August 4, 1 998) .  
226 1 7  u.s.c. � 5 1 2 . 
::. ::.7  Yen. A lfred C . , Internet Service Provider Liabilitrfhr Suhscriher Copvright lnfi-ingement, 
Enterprise Liahilitv, and the First A mendment, 88 Geo. L ..l . 1 f\33 , 1 888 (2000):  Fox. Adam R. , The 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Disabusing the Notion o(a Constitutional Moment. Rutgers 
Computer & Technology L . J .  Vol . 27 (200 1 ) � Brannan. Anna Claveria.  Fair Use Doctrine and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright A ct: Does Fair Use Exist under the DMC A ?. Santa Clara Law Review. 
Vol .  42. No. 1 (200 I ) . 
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require an ISP to remove copyrighted materia l ,  and at the same time an ISP  must 
claim the inabi l ity to control the materia l .  228 Thi s  language certainly leaves room for 
interpretation, and at least one critic claims the provi sion violates the First 
Amendment. Attorney Adam Fox argued that i f i SPs are encouraged to seek 
protection from 5 1 2 ' s  safe harbor, then I SPs may become more aggressive i n  
removing content-even a t  the cost of removing content that is  not actual ly 
infringing.229 Thus, publ ic  access i s  diminished by overzealous ISPs.  
In bui lding a safe harbor, Congress may have also built disinterested agents who 
have l ittle regard for F irst Amendment rights to infonnation . Certainly ISPs wi l l  seek 
to protect themselves from l it igation . But the DMCA provides for I SPs a "get-out-of-
jai l-free" card by simply removing any questioned content. It i s  natural to assume that 
the ISP 's  interest in avoiding l iabi l ity wi l l  become more acute, and the avoidance of 
copyright infringement l iabi l ity wi l l  virtual ly mandate a standard policy for removal . 
Meanwhile the freedom of the Internet may suffer from a private pol ice force 
built by the DMCA. "[T]he government has arguably transfonned [ ISPs] into quasi-
admini strative bodies, with unelected decisionmakers who are answerable only to 
their shareholders ."210 The question remains how much copyright information wil l  be 
banished from the Internet as a result of ISP prudence. 
In terms of damage to the spirit of copyright, thi s  thesi s finds crit ic ism of Section 
5 1 2  less compell ing than that of Section 1 20 1 . (However, this thesis is in  ful l  
agreement with a l l  critic ism of  Section 5 1 2  ' s  dismal construction of  language . )  
22x 1 7  U .S .C. § 5 1 2(c) ( 1 )(C)  and (c) ( 1 )( 8 ) .  
l ll) � -
-- See supra note 1 l'\3 .  
'1 � ( )  -' See supra note 1 115 .  
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Section 5 1 2  seeks to protect J SPs as innocents to be shielded from swarms of 
l itigation rather than as purveyors of infringement. The crit icism assumes the ISPs 
wi l l  become more active in their removal of questionable content. Whi le  the safe 
harbor provision certainly entices I SPs to do j ust that, the market wi l l  also entice the 
I SPs to leave material onl ine. In the end, the ISPs serve the market, and they are 
checked and balanced by  their competition. Overzealous removal of content wil l  
force users to another I SP .  
On the other hand, the empowering of  the I SP to control material i s  a troubling 
consequence of Section 5 1 2 . The ISP becomes the judge in  a non-j ury tria l .  And 
unless formal action i s  taken, the ISP is  the ult imate arbiter of the inclusion or 
deletion of materia l .  
A. For Further Study 
While the Internet is  recognized as a device that can make copyright 
infringement vastly easier, it is a lso a device that can make copyright pol ic ing far 
easier. By  employing the Internet, copyright owners are equipped with the tools 
necessary to quickly conduct a search for their material all over the world .  Never 
before have copyright owners had the abi li ty to keep tabs on the use of their own 
work. 
And whi le Congress busily improves copyright protection to meet the 
chal lenges of new technology, one wonders if copyright protection has become so 
invasive that the public has lost its abi l ity to properly use the materia l .  In U.S. v. 
Elcoms(4f, Adobe systems bui l t  an electronic book reader that also had the capabi l i ty 
9 1  
of using an electronic  voice to "read" the book out loud.n 1 The software worked with 
eBook files that users could  purchase, and the consumers could pay extra for the read-
out-loud feature. Dmitry Sklyarov, a Russian computer programmer, developed 
software that cracked Adobe ' s  book reader program ,  a l lowing users to access the 
read-out-loud feature on any book. 
Beyond the DMCA issues that this case involves, future study might look at 
the invasive abi l i ty that copyright owners have to control the use of a document after 
sale. This new abi l ity for copyright owners to control the use of their work bumps up 
against the "First Sale" doctrine. When consumers bought an ordinary book in  the 
past, copyright certainly did not have the power to prevent the buyer from reading the 
book aloud. 
S imi larly, software programs,  music files ,  and even electronic pictures could  
be  bui l t  with internal technology that detects how i t  i s  being used, preventing 
"unauthorized" use such as giving music away to friends, sharing a book, sel l ing 
software, or even manipulating a photograph. 
The First Sale doctrine, Section 1 06 of the 1 976 Copyright Act, permits a 
buyer of copyrighted materia l  "without the authority or the Copyright Owner, to sel l  
or otherwise di spose of the possession of that phonorecord." The increased capabi l ity 
of copyright owners to control their work, even after first sale, compels  Congress to 
re-examine this code in l ight of technological advancements. 
In  addition, the DMCA may rai se privacy concerns.  As discussed in this  
thesis ,  the "safe harbor'' provi sion in the DMCA ' s  Section 5 1 2  a l lows l SPs to avoid 
'l � l - See supra, note 9 1 .  
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copyright l iabil ity by removing content from avai labi l ity when a proper claim i s  made 
about the copyright ownership of that content. But of particular concem, Section 
5 1 2(h) says, "A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner's behalf 
may request the c lerk of any United States district court to i ssue a subpoena to a 
service provider for identi fication of an a l leged infringer in accordance with thi s  
subsection."232 Thi s  subpoena would  not require the copyright owner to fi l e  a lawsuit . 
If copyright owners find protected work on an ISP ,  they can not only request that the 
I SP remove the content, but a lso demand that the I SP release the identity of the 
people who posted the content, without the need for the expensive discovery phase of 
a lawsuit. 
S imi lar to the conflict between Wai-Mart and FatWal let,233 the Recording 
Industry Association of America found copyrighted content on the I SP  "Verizon." 
Invoking the DMCA Section 5 1 2 , the R IAA asked Verizon to remove the content and 
to reveal the identity of the subscriber who posted the content in  the first p lace. 
"Verizon argued that the shortcut was meant to apply to only a narrow set of 
circumstances and that i ts broad use would  violate subscribers ' privacy and due 
process rights ."234 However, Judge John D. Bates of the Federal D istrict Court in 
Washington di sagreed, and ordered Verizon to reveal the i dentity of the subscriber. 
" [The rul ing] opens the door for anyone who makes a mere a l legation of copyright 
infringement to gain complete access to private subscriber information without the 
232 1 7  u.s.c. § 5 1 2(h) .  
233 See di scussion at note 1 20. 
234  H armon. Amy. Vcrizon Ordered to Civt' !dentif\· o/N<'t Suhscrilwr. The New York Times, page C l  
( January 22,  2003 ) .  
93 
due process protections afforded by the courts," said Sara Deutsch, vice president and 
. . 2 l �  associate general counsel for Venzon. · · 
Additional study of the D MCA may include conducting a qual itative survey 
of webmasters, analyzing their business practices in relation to the DMCA 
subsections di scussed here. Are webmasters incl ined to remove content that may be 
copyright protected? Is  material removed with more regularity due to the DMCA's  
influence? In addition, what changes have l SPs made to  their posted pol ic ies to 
conform with not only  the DMCA, but a lso the case J aw that has resulted from it? 
The study might a lso include an analysi s  of copyright security devices. Are 
these devices being used more frequently? Are fair users gaining access? How are 
l ibraries and other researchers gaining access to thi s  copyrighted information? Is the 
DMCA ' s  required two-year study on the effect of Section 1 20 1  causing improvement 
in the Act? 
=' ' '  ibid. 
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